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Abstract
We study the design of child care subsidies in an optimal welfare problem with
heterogeneous private market productivities. The optimal subsidy schedule is qualita-
tively similar to the existing US scheme. Efficiency mandates a subsidy on formal child
care costs, with higher subsidies paid to lower income earners and a kink as a function
of child care expenditure. Marginal labor income tax rates are set lower than the labor
wedges, with the potential to generate negative marginal tax rates. We calibrate our
model to features of the US labor market and focus on single mothers with children
aged below 6. The optimal program provides stronger participation but milder inten-
sive margin incentives for low income earners with subsidy rates starting very high
and decreasing with income more steeply than those in the US.
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1 Introduction
The transition of mothers’ role from traditional full-time homemakers to potential bread-
winners over the past decades indicates the increasing involvement of mothers as ac-
tive members of the labor force. In parallel, policy makers are increasing their focus on
child care subsidy programs. In the US, programs such as the Dependent Care Tax Credit
(DCTC) and the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) are benefiting from increased
funding.1 The focus of policy debates has so far been on affordability and quality of child
care. As such, the literature on child care subsidy programs has outlined the use of child
care subsidies as a tool to promote economic self-sufficiency among low income families
and decrease their reliance on welfare.2
Even though there is a vast literature on the impact of child care subsidies on employ-
ment of mothers and considerable policy debates on affordability of child care, none has
so far looked at the optimal design of child care subsidies. We study the design of such
subsidies within an optimal welfare framework, where heterogeneous agents have private
information on labor market productivities. Agents have child care needs and allocate
effort between the primary labor market and household child care activities.
We show that it is optimal to pay a positive child care subsidy on formal child care costs
and that higher child care subsidies should be paid to lower income earners. We therefore
add an efficiency reason to existing debates for providing child care subsidies to low in-
come earners and suggest that a sliding scale child care subsidy scheme would be an optimal
way of promoting employment while achieving re-distributional goals. Moreover, very
much in line with the qualitative features of the existing scheme in the US, the optimal sub-
sidy must be kinked as a function of child care expenditure. An agent whose formal child
care expenditure is lower than the kink-point faces a positive subsidy while it is optimal to
set a non positive subsidy for child care expenditure above the kink-point.
The intuition for the three key qualitative features of the efficient child care subsidy is
as follows. Achieving re-distributional goals (or raising revenue for public expenditures)
require income transfers across productivity levels, which in turn may discourage formal
labor supply. Since household child care increases the individual return from reducing
formal labor hours, a positive child care subsidy rate is required to discourage household
child care activities. Moreover, for each given productivity level (type), the higher the la-
1In 2010, $3.4bn were made available via the DCTC while in 2013, the CCDF made $5.3bn available. Recent
debates include the 2011 Obama Administration’s proposal to double the DCTC for families earning below
$85k (Tax Policy Center, 2010b) and the FY2015 budget requesting an increase of $807m to fund the CCDF
(National Center for Infant et al., 2015).
2There is a wide array of literature providing evidence of positive impacts of child care subsidies on
maternal labor supply (Bainbridge et al., 2003; Blau, 2003; Blau and Tekin, 2007; Ho, 2013; Ho, 2015; Kimmel,
1995; Tekin, 2005). Early childhood intervention proponents also argue about the positive benefits of high
quality child care on children’s outcomes (Karoly et al., 1998; Currie, 2001; Heckman, 2006).
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bor income required, the lower the time available for household child care such that there
is a lesser need to discourage such activities. Hence, the optimal child care subsidy rate
decreases with income. Finally, the kink feature of the optimal subsidies is needed to discour-
age both high and low skilled individuals from digressing from the optimal labor supply.
Whereas a high productivity agent is typically tempted to generate a lower labor income
and increase household child care, a low skilled individual may be tempted to produce a
higher labor income and reduce household child care. Both of these possibilities are detri-
mental to incentives and may hinder the achievement of public goals. Since low and high
skilled individuals face different marginal returns from household child care, the optimal
child care subsidy schedule is kinked such that the target rates are different before and
after the kink.
By jointly designing child care subsidies and non-linear income dependent child al-
lowances, we also show that the new policy tool cannot be replicated by a negative marginal
tax rate based on earned income of low skilled workers alone (such as, for example, the
Earned Income Tax Credit).3 Our implementation exercise generates an interesting dis-
crepancy between the standard labor wedge (which is always positive in our model) and
the marginal tax on earned income. In particular, the optimal marginal taxes are set at
lower rates than the labor wedges due to the interaction with the sliding scale pattern of
child care subsidies. While the sliding scale pattern directly counteracts non-local child
care deviation incentives, it may have disincentive effects on labor supply. Marginal in-
come tax rates are, therefore, lowered so as to adequately counter-balance such disincen-
tives. This discrepancy is particularly relevant at low income levels and may potentially
lead to negative marginal taxes on income.
This paper also provides quantitative estimates of the optimal child care subsidy rates.
We calibrate our model to features of the US labor market and focus on single mothers
with children aged below 6. According to US Census data, the number of children living
in single parent homes has nearly doubled between 1960 to 2010 with nearly one third (15
million) of children currently living with a single mother. We focus on single mothers with
young children because they tend to have high child care needs and are often targeted by
generous transfer programs. Our study is therefore designed to focus on low and middle
income earners. Focusing on single mothers within a heterogeneous agent framework en-
ables us to identify key trade-offs involved in child care while abstracting from the practical
complexity of modeling joint transfers in multi-adult households.
We use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to calibrate the empirical dis-
tribution of market productivities as well as our preference parameters. The presence of
3Consider a high skilled individual who faces a positive wage subsidy when earning low income but a
positive marginal tax when earning high income. Such individual would be tempted to work a few hours in
the formal sector, enjoy the wage subsidy, and, in addition, engage in higher household child care so as to
save on formal child care costs. Thus, child care subsidies have an independent role to play in our context.
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child care needs means that we also model labor supply at the extensive margin (in addi-
tion to the intensive margin). Given the current tax and transfer system, some low market
productivity agents self-select into unemployment while one may want them to work in
the optimal program. We therefore impute the potential wage distribution of unemployed
mothers in line with the empirical labor literature.
The optimal program provides stronger participation incentives but milder intensive
margin incentives for low income earners compared to the US scheme. In particular, the
optimal child care subsidy rates start at very high levels and decrease with income more steeply than
those in the current US scheme. In the baseline calibration, the optimal coverage varies from
80% of formal child care cost for single mothers earning below $10k to 20% for mothers
earning approximately $20k a year. No child care subsidy is paid for labor earnings above
$25k-$30k.
Literature Barnett (1993) argues that child care subsidies should be offered to mothers
with young children to counteract the disincentive effects of the current tax system on la-
bor supply. A similar principle emerges in the representative agent models of Kleven et al.
(2000) who study linear commodity taxation in presence of home production. We confirm
this important principle. However, we also find that the optimal pattern of child care sub-
sidies across income groups do not mimic at all (neither quantitatively nor qualitatively)
the shape of the labor income taxes, suggesting a richer role for such instrument.4
To implement the constrained efficient allocation, we allow the government to use for-
mal child care subsidies to indirectly tax home activities, which would otherwise be detri-
mental for incentive compatibility. This is in a similar spirit to the exercises performed
in the New Dynamic Public Finance literature (Golosov et al., 2013; Kocherlakota, 2010;
Saez, 2002b; Werning, 2011) where both labor supply and saving wedges are considered.
The child care margin is different from the saving margin studied in these works, both
economically and technically. For example, due to the non-separability between labor sup-
ply and child care, the implementation of the second best allocation in our model requires
a kink in the subsidy schedule. Thanks to the additive separability assumption between
consumption and leisure in these studies, savings can instead be taxed linearly.5
The introduction of child care relates our paper to the literature on income taxation in
the presence of non-market activities (Beaudry et al., 2009; Chone´ and Laroque, 2011; Saez,
2002a).6 This literature considers heterogeneous cost of labor market participation and has
4In fact, even in the existing US scheme, child care subsidies seem to follow a somewhat more complex
pattern. For example, since the Earned Income Tax Credit scheme implies a negative income tax rate for low
income earners with young children, if child care subsidies were to merely mimic (counteract) the pattern of
the marginal income taxes, child care costs should be taxed - not subsidized - for low income earners.
5For the need of a kink in savings taxation in the presence of nonseparabilities, see Kocherlakota (2004).
6For a very recent contribution, see also Kohne and Sachs (2016).
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argued that it is optimal to subsidize low income earners in the form of a negative marginal
income tax rate. We consider a different framework where mothers differ in labor market
productivities but face the same hourly cost of formal child care. As in these works, our
model involves a multidimensional choice problem.7 Although we are unable to adopt
the standard ‘local approach’, the model permits a sharp characterization of the optimal
allocation by focusing on only the downward incentive constraints.
Also related to our paper is the literature in quantitative micro and macro economics
that aims at numerically computing welfare or labor supply gains from policy reforms
as opposed to characterizing the fully optimal child care subsidy and non-linear transfer
scheme as we do. Bick (2016) and Domeij and Klein (2012) find that child care subsidies
may encourage labor supply of German mothers. Guner et al. (2014) find that an increase
in child care subsidies in the US context may increase labor supply especially along the
extensive margin of participation. Blundell and Shephard (2012) estimate a structural la-
bor supply model and focus on single mothers in the UK. Our work complements these
studies in that it analyzes a richer (and hence more flexible) policy tool in an optimal wel-
fare framework with heterogeneous private market productivities. Flexibility supported
by rigorous economic principles might be valuable when the aim is to assess the optimal-
ity of a complex scheme such as the existing one in the US (see below). Moreover, studying
the efficient design of child care subsidies jointly with optimal child allowances allows us
to understand how they have an independent role from income taxes.
We document the main components of child care subsidy programs in the US in Section
2. In Section 3, we present our model of the household where mothers choose both labor
supply in the primary market and household-provided child care. Optimal policy and
implementation results are presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. The calibration
exercise and numerical results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 US Child Related Subsidy Programs
This section describes the 2010 US tax and subsidy scheme with a particular focus on child
care subsidies and child dependent allowances. We outline the main features of interest
in two major child care (price related) subsidy programs, the Dependent Care Tax Credit
(DCTC) and the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF). We then describe the child de-
7There are important differences in the framework considered, which imply different technical difficulties
and require a different approach. In Beaudry et al. (2009), the different activities are perfect substitutes, while
in Chone´ and Laroque (2011) and Saez (2002a), agents face heterogeneous fixed costs of participation to the
labor market. Our model contemplates two genuinely different intensive margins (work and child care). Our
framework is more closely related to Besley and Coate (1995), but the characteristic of our model does not
allow for the (more standard) local-approach adopted in that paper. Instead, we follow a line of attack to the
problem that is similar to that indicated by Matthews and Moore (1987).
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pendent tax exemptions and allowances that are available to families with children under
the federal income tax scheme, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and the Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). Further details are reported in Appendix B.3.
2010 US Tax and Subsidy Schedules
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Figure 1: Panel (a) reports child care subsidy rates under DCTC and CCDF, and the consolidated
rates (solid line) as a function of gross family income. Panel (b) reports the amounts of child care
subsidies received as a function of total formal child care costs and by family income (y) for a family
with two children aged below 13. Panel (c) depicts the amounts of net income taxes payable as a
function of gross family income for a single person with 0 and 2 children. The net income taxes
include TANF, federal and social security taxes, and EITC. The difference between net income taxes
for a single person without and with children are represented by the solid line, and are interpreted
as the child allowances that a parent is eligible for under the US welfare system.
Child Care Subsidies (DCTC and CCDF) The DCTC is a non-refundable federal income
tax credit program available to families with children aged under 13 and covers part of
child care expenses. The CCDF is a block grant fund managed by states within certain
federal guidelines. CCDF subsidies are available as vouchers or as part of direct purchase
programs to families with children under 13 and with income below 85% of the state me-
dian income.
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Employment Requirements. Both subsidy programs are conditional on parental employment.
The DCTC is a tax credit available only to families who earn income and pay taxes while
the CCDF is available to low income families who are engaged in work related activities.8
Sliding Scale. In both the DCTC and the CCDF, the child care subsidy rate declines as in-
come increases.9 In particular, the DCTC has a tax credit rate of 35% of child care expenses
for families with annual gross income of less than $15,000. The tax credit rate declines by
1% for each $2,000 of additional income until it reaches a constant tax credit rate of 20% for
families with annual gross income above $43,000. Whereas the federal recommended sub-
sidy rate for the CCDF is 90%, only a certain proportion of eligible households receive the
subsidy: 39%, 24%, and 5% of households living, respectively, below, between 101% and
150%, and above 150% of the poverty threshold (US Department of Health and Human
Services, 2009). Panel (a) of Figure 1 illustrates the average child care subsidy rates under
the DCTC and the CCDF according to family income.10
Decreasing Coverage. The coverage rate decreases with total expenditure on child care. The
DCTC has a cap on child care expenditure of $3,000 for families with one child and $6,000
for families with two children. As of 2010, the CCDF maximum reimbursement rates
ranged from $280 per week (Puerto Rico) to $1,465 per month (New York) for an infant
in full time formal child care (Minton et al., 2012). In addition, 17 states had a cap on the
number of hours of formal child care use, ranging from 45 hours per week (Michigan) to
20 hours per day (Montana). Panel (b) of Figure 1 illustrates the amount of child care sub-
sidy that a family with two eligible children would receive under the DCTC and CCDF. We
illustrate the scheme for families with two children as our sample of interest (single moth-
ers with children aged below 6) have two children on average (see Section 6 for details on
our sample from the CPS). Consistent with the rates reported in Panel (a), the slope of the
subsidy amount schedule decreases with family income before the cap of $6,000.
Child Allowances (Tax Exemptions, EITC and TANF) In addition to subsidies on the
cost of formal child care, parents in the US are also eligible for relatively generous child
dependent allowances that are conditional on the presence of children in the household.
Under the federal income taxation scheme, taxable income is based on earnings minus
standard deductions of $5,700 for a single childless person and $8,400 for a single parent,
8In 2010, 81% of families receiving CCDF were employed with the remaining families in training (Admin-
istration for Children and Families, 2012).
9While there are differences across states in the generosity of the subsidy rates, in all states, the child care
subsidy rates strictly follow a sliding scale pattern (Gabe et al., 2001).
10States using CCDF funding are also required to have co-payments from the family that increase with
family income. We do not take into account the state wide variations in co-payments in our analysis and
focus on the average subsidy rates at the federal level. Following the allocation rates described above, Figure
1 is drawn by imputing an average CCDF subsidy rate of 35.1%, 21.6%, and 4.5% to households with income
below, between 101% and 150%, and above 150% of the poverty threshold, respectively.
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minus exemptions of $3,650 for each taxpayer and dependent. Both childless individuals
and parents are subject to social security (SS) taxes set at 7.65% of earnings.
Working families are eligible for the EITC, which is a refundable tax credit and follows a
’trapezoid’ pattern.11 Parents are also eligible for TANF, which is a cash assistance program
for families with children aged below 18. In 2010, nearly 80% of TANF recipients were
unemployed while a family with two children received on average $412 of TANF benefits
per month (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2011).
Panel (c) of Figure 1 illustrates the net income taxes payable by a single childless per-
son and by a single parent with two children, computed as federal income and SS taxes
minus EITC benefits for the employed, and minus TANF and additional benefits for the
unemployed (see Section 6 for details). The demographic dependent child allowances are
computed as the difference between net taxes of a childless individual and net taxes of a
single parent with two children. The figure illustrates at least three qualitative properties
of the US tax and transfer system. First, child allowances are by all means equivalent to
non-linear income transfers. Second, the increasing pattern of the dashed line indicates
that, under the US system, childless households always face a positive marginal tax on in-
come. Third, the child allowances paid to mothers with children below 6 imply a negative
marginal income tax, as indicated by the decreasing segment of the dash-dotted line, for
earnings below $15,000.12
3 Model
From the richness of the US child related transfer and subsidy program, a few normative
questions emerge naturally. Is it economically sensible to pay a positive child care sub-
sidy to working mothers? Can the same margin be accounted for with properly designed
taxes and transfers on labor income? Should the child care subsidy rate depend on earned
income? If yes, should marginal taxes for working mothers be adjusted relative to those
levied on childless households? And should the child care subsidy rate depend on total
child care cost? In particular, should there be a cap above which the subsidy rate is zero?
In order to address these questions, a flexible economic model is needed, where rich
patterns of income taxes and child care subsidies can be studied. The framework presented
in this section, introduces the possibility of engaging in household provided child care in
an optimal welfare problem a` la Mirrlees in a centralized economy. This relatively simple
11For a single childless person, EITC benefits are phased-in at a rate of 7.65% up to a maximum of $457 in
benefits. Families with children benefit from much more generous EITC benefits. For example, for a single
parent with two children, EITC benefits are phased-in at a rate of 40% up to a maximum of $5,036 in benefits.
12While we focus on the federal income tax, some states also impose state income taxes with rates ranging
from 0% to 11%. Low income parents would still benefit from a negative marginal tax rate even if we were
to take into account the highest marginal tax rate of 11% (Tax Policy Center, 2010c).
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model captures some of the key trade-offs faced by working mothers. We address the
optimal design of a non-linear transfer and subsidy scheme that implements the optimum
in a decentralized economy in Section 5.
Agents and Technologies Consider an economy with a continuum of agents who are
heterogeneous in market productivities z. We consider discrete levels of market produc-
tivity, with z1 = 0 being the minimum and zN > 0 the maximum, that is, z ∈ Z :=
{z1, . . . , zi, . . . , zN} . Agents of type zi constitute a fraction pi(zi) > 0 of the population,
with ∑Ni=1 pi (zi) = 1. We interpret agents with z1 = 0 as agents who are subject to ad-
verse labor market conditions (the involuntarily unemployed or unlucky), thereby render-
ing their market productivity zero.
Agents can allocate effort to market work or to household child care activities. An agent
who devotes l ≥ 0 units of effort on the market produces y = zl of consumption goods.
Each agent has child care needs that are normalized to 1 unit of effort, and devote effort
level h ≥ 0 towards them. The remaining amount of child care is covered by purchasing
child care from the formal child care market at cost ω per unit.13 We assume that zN >
ω > 0.14
Agents’ utility function is additive in consumption c and effort cost v(e) :
c− v(e),
where e = l + h is total effort and c represents household consumption net of formal child
care cost f := ω (1− h).
We note that the theoretical results that follow are generalizable to the case where for-
mal child care is an imperfect substitute for household care. In particular, one could assume
that one unit of household care corresponds to g(h) hours of formal care, with g concave.
The assumption of quasi-linear utility is also made for analytical tractability as in Besley
and Coate (1995) and Kleven et al. (2009). We show how the results generalize to the case
with concave preferences in Section 6.
Assumption 1 We assume that the cost function is strictly increasing and strictly convex: v′ (e) >
0 and v′′ (e) > 0 for all e. In addition, assume that v′(0) = 0.
13We interpret child care needs as the amount of child care time that can be substituted for paid care during
a normal working week. In other words, while h = 0 implies that full time formal child care is employed, it
does not necessarily imply that mothers never look after their children. For example, mothers could still be
taking care of their children during evenings after work.
14Whenever either one of the inequalities is not satisfied, our framework specifies into a standard Mirrlees
optimal tax model. First, as can be seen by analogy to the proof of Proposition 1(iii) below, when ω = 0 then
h(z) = 0 for all z. In addition, from Proposition 2(a) below, if zN ≤ ω then all agents will either be pooled
into unemployment or engage in full-time household child.
8
Laissez-Faire Equilibrium Suppose that agents face no taxes nor subsidies and there are
no insurance markets. They solve
max
l≥0,h≥0
zl −ω (1− h)+ − v(l + h),
where (1− h)+ := max{0, 1− h}. In the laissez-faire equilibrium, high productivity agents
specialize into employment while low productivity agents provide household child care.
If z > ω, they optimally choose h = 0 and l > 0. These high productivity agents consume
c = zl − ω and labor supply solves z = v′ (l) . When agents have z < ω, they all choose
h > 0. Low productivity agents with employment opportunities (0 < z < ω) may also
work after all child care needs have been taken care of, that is, if h = 1. Since, household
child care does not depend on labor market productivities, all unemployed agents engage
in the same level of household child care and enjoy the same consumption. On the other
hand, among employed agents, both earnings and consumption increase in z.
Government and Information Consider a government who aims at maximizing social
welfare. The government does not observe market productivities. The government, how-
ever, knows the probability distribution of the different types of agents among the popu-
lation. The government cannot observe labor supply while it can observe output from the
labor market (labor earnings, y), and the total cost of formal child care purchased by each
agent ( f ). Since f = ω (1− h), household child care (h) is verifiable (while leisure is not ob-
servable). For the purpose of the present application, we endow the government with the
amount M of resources to be shared among agents. We interpret M as resources allocated
to the group of agents we are interested in (i.e., single mothers with young children), which
are obtained from general taxation or other sources that are not studied in this paper. By
the revelation principle, we can restrict ourselves to direct mechanisms defined over Z.
Definition 1 An allocation consists of consumption functions c : Z → IR, market production
functions y : Z → IR+, and household-provided child care functions h : Z → IR+, for all types. Let
Ω be the set of such allocations.
The government also has to satisfy the budget constraint, which can be written as:
N
∑
i=1
pi (zi) c (zi) +ω ≤
N
∑
i=1
pi (zi) [y (zi) +ωh(zi)] + M. (1)
Modeling the problem as though the government takes all production and assigns con-
sumption and child care, is equivalent to imposing a net tax of T (z) := y (z) + ω(1 −
h(z))− c (z) on each agent of type z. Constraint (1) is equivalent to ∑i pi(zi)T(zi) + M ≥ 0.
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The government faces the standard trade-off between redistributing resources and pre-
serving work incentives. In the laissez-faire allocation, utility increases in z among em-
ployed agents and the unemployed get the lowest utility level. Should the government
provide too generous redistribution towards low z types, high z types would be tempted
to mimic low z types by decreasing effort.
Constrained Efficient Allocation (Second-Best) Since each agent has private information
on market productivity, the government faces a set of incentive compatibility constraints.
The incentive constraints guarantee the truthful revelation of agents’ type z. Agents will
only reveal their true type if government policy is such that utility from telling the truth is
higher than utility from pretending to be a different type.
Definition 2 A reporting strategy is a mapping σ : Z → Z. By the revelation principle, the
planner aims at implementing the truth-telling strategy, σ∗, where σ∗ (z) = z ∀z ∈ Z.
With private information, government allocation has the same domain as above but
is based on agents’ declarations σ. The definition of an allocation must be re-interpreted
accordingly, but still follows Definition 1.
Let
V(σ|z) := c (σ)− v
(
y (σ)
z
+ h (σ)
)
be the utility that agent of type z obtains by pretending to be of type σ. The government
must guarantee that the agent prefers the truth-telling strategy to any other strategy. Truth-
telling requires that for all z ∈ Z,
V(z|z) ≥ V(σ|z) ∀σ ∈ Z. (2)
A key question in the design of an efficient welfare program is how to optimally trade-
off redistribution for effort incentives. The objective of the government is to maximize
welfare:
W(c, y, h; φ) =∑
i
pi (zi) φ(zi)
[
c (zi)− v
(
y (zi)
zi
+ h (zi)
)]
, (3)
where the function φ : Z → IR+ defines the social weighting given by the authorities to the
different agents’ classes z ∈ Z.
Definition 3 A second best allocation is a solution to the maximization of the objective (3) over
(c, y, h) ∈ Ω subject to the budget constraint (1) and the incentive constraints (2).
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4 The Optimal Allocation
In this section, we characterize the constrained efficient (second best) allocation. In a stan-
dard Mirrlees problem with unidimensional choice of effort, it is customary to use a ‘local
approach’ (i.e., solve the relaxed problem that only imposes local incentive compatibility
constraints). Under the standard assumption that preferences satisfy the ‘single-crossing
property of indifference curve maps’ (i.e., the marginal rate of substitutions between the
choices y and c are monotone in agent’s type z), the solution derived from the relaxed
problem coincides with the solution to the global problem. In addition, a robust result in
the standard optimal taxation model is that one can focus on (local) downwards incentive
constraints and hence always obtain downwards distortions, that is, positive labor wedges.
Our model involves a multidimensional choice of effort (work and child care). The
monotonicity of marginal rates of substitution between any pair of choices does not suf-
fice the ‘single crossing property of indifference curve maps’ any more. The most typically
adopted approach in the literature on multidimensional choice is to still use a local ap-
proach and look for conditions that guarantee that the solution to the relaxed problem de-
liver a uniformly monotone allocation.15 Unfortunately, in our framework, uniform mono-
tonicity of the optimal allocations cannot easily be guaranteed a priori. We will hence
follow a non-local approach.16 We look for conditions that guarantee what Matthews and
Moore (1987) refer to as double crossing. This, in turn, allows us to only focus on downward
incentive constraints as shown in Lemma 1 below. Assumption 2 below guarantees that
the utility levels generated by any two allocations, (c¯, y¯, h¯) and (cˆ, yˆ, hˆ), cross no more than
twice in the z space (see Lemma 2 and Figure A1 in Appendix A).
Assumption 2 Let e > 0. The ratio v
′′(e)
v′(e) is decreasing in e.
Standard cost functions such as the quadratic, the constant Frisch elasticity: v(e) =
1
θ
e1+γ
1+γ , θ,γ > 0, and the exponential cost functions, satisfy this assumption.
An analytical derivation of the constrained efficient allocation also requires an assump-
tion on the social weighting function φ(·).
Assumption 3 Let E [φ] := ∑Ni=1 pi(zi)φ(zi). We have φ(z1) ≥ E [φ] ; Moreover, for j ≥ 3, the
weight φ(zj) is lower than the average social welfare weight: φ(zj) ≤ E [φ] .
15This is what Matthews and Moore (1987) refer to as ’attribute ordering’. For example, since both the
marginal rates of substitution between (−c) and y, and between (−c) and h decrease with z, if y and h were
either both monotone increasing or both monotone decreasing in z, the allocation would satisfy the single
crossing property for the agent’s problem and hence local incentive constraints would imply global incentive
compatibility (see Lemma 0 in Matthews and Moore (1987) and Section 7.3 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
16Besley and Coate (1995), in Section VII, solve a model similar to ours using a local approach and assuming
monotonicity of the marginal rates of substitution. Crucially, they also assume that ω = 0 and z1 > 0. This
implies that all agents are optimally required to choose h = 0. Their model, hence, reduces to a version of
the standard Mirrlees framework where the monotonicity of the marginal rates of substitution implies single
crossing of the indifference curve maps.
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Note that Assumption 3 is satisfied by the Utilitarian social welfare function with equal
weights φ(zi) ≡ 1 on all agents. In this case, however, the allocation would display no
trade-off between efficiency and redistribution. At the other extreme, the conditions of As-
sumption 3 are satisfied by the Rawlsian welfare function: WR(c, e) := mini {c(zi)− v (e(zi))}.
As we will see below, incentive compatibility implies that c(zi)− v (e(zi)) increases with i,
and hence, the Rawlsian criterion implies φ(z1) > 0 and φ(zi) = 0 for i > 1. The Rawlsian
criterion can be seen as the limit case for the following class of welfare objectives:
Wˆ(c, e; ρ) :=
(
N
∑
i=1
pi(zi)[ci − v(ei)]ρ
) 1
ρ
,
for ρ→ −∞. Intuitively, for ρ finite but sufficiently low, the implied Pareto weights satisfy
Assumption 3. Although it allows for non-monotone φ’s, Assumption 3 is satisfied when-
ever the government has a sufficiently strong desire for redistribution at the bottom.17
Lemma 1 (DIC Approach) Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, any solution to the second best prob-
lem where only downward incentive constraints are imposed - that is, when the set of conditions (2)
is relaxed to be σ ≤ z - delivers an optimal allocation. In addition, the ‘local’ downward incentive
constraints can be imposed as equalities. Finally, if the upward incentive constraint is binding for
two types zj < zk, then it is optimal for all agents with type zi : zj ≤ zi ≤ zk to receive the same
allocation (i.e, bunching).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 states that the solution from the relaxed second best problem, where the gov-
ernment maximizes the objective (3) subject to the budget constraint (1) and only the down-
ward incentive compatibility constraints in (2), delivers a solution to the original problem.
Given the relaxed problem with downward incentive constraints (DIC) only, we show
that the local downward incentive constraints (LDIC) must be satisfied with equality. This
crucially relies on the fact that preferences satisfy the double crossing property. Should
LDIC between type zi+1 and type zi be slack, then the double crossing property implies that
the non-local DIC for preventing type zi+1 from mimicking lower types will also be slack. It
would therefore be possible to improve welfare at no additional cost and without violating
incentives, by redistributing from type zi+1 to all other types. Under Assumption 3, such
redistribution will weakly improve welfare. It is then straightforward to show that when
the LDIC bind, the upward incentive constraints (UIC) will also be satisfied.
Thereafter, we indicate the allocation obtained using Lemma 1 as ‘the optimal alloca-
tion’, and denote it by adding an asterisk as superscript.
17The requirement that φ(z1) ≥ E [φ] guarantees a well-defined problem and can be replaced by a partic-
ipation constraint. φ is typically assumed to be non-increasing so that φ(z1) ≥ E [φ] will be automatically
satisfied.
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Proposition 1 (Minimal Properties) Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, we have:
(a) The ‘net surplus’ y∗(z) +ωh∗(z)− c∗(z) is non-decreasing in z;
(b) Utility of agents in equilibrium V∗(z|z) is non-decreasing in z, and strictly increasing be-
tween any two levels zi+1 > zi when y∗(zi) > 0.
(c) For all z, h∗(z) ≤ 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Points (a) and (b) in Proposition 1 summarize a general principle. Obtaining a larger
net surplus from high types is the sole reason why the government is ready to trade-off re-
distribution and screen agents instead of pooling them. The last part of Proposition 1 states
that providing household child care beyond child care needs would be costly in terms of
effort without yielding any additional returns. In particular, this implies that providing
h > 1 does not help satisfy the incentive constraints. This is because consumption is a
superior instrument to achieve separation between types.
Proposition 2 (Characterization) Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, we have:
(a) Unemployment: Recall that z1 = 0. We have y∗(z1) = 0 and h∗ (z1) > 0, where
1− 1
ω
v′ (h∗(z1)) ≥ 0, (4)
with equality whenever v′(1) ≥ ω. If v′(1) ≤ ω, then h∗(z1) = 1. In addition, for all z
such that y∗ (z) = 0, type z gets the same allocation as type z1.
(b) Low productivity: Let z ≤ ω. We have h∗ (z) > 0, and if y∗(z) > 0, then h∗(z) = 1.
(c) Segmentation: If y∗(z) > 0, then y∗ (z′) > 0 for all z′ > z.
(d) Monotonicity: Let z′ > z for which we have no bunching. If h∗(z′) ≤ h∗(z), then y∗(z′) >
y∗(z); and if y∗(z′) ≤ y∗(z), then h∗(z′) > h∗(z).
(e) Wedges for the employed: Let zi be such that y∗ (zi) > 0. Then labor wedges are non-negative:
1− 1
zi
v′ (e∗(zi)) ≥ 0; (5)
If, in addition, h∗ (zi) > 0, then the child care wedges are also non-negative:
1− 1
ω
v′ (e∗(zi)) ≥ 0. (6)
Both wedges are strictly positive whenever φ(zi+1) < E [φ].
For i = N, the labor wedge is zero and h∗(zN) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition for result (a) is simple. When y (z) = 0, market productivity does not
matter anymore so that all agents receive the same allocation, that is, we have pooling
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among the unemployed. Result (b) states that low market productivity types may provide
positive labor supply only when all child care needs have been met. Statement (c) delivers
a minimal monotonicity condition: if an agent is employed, then more productive agents
will also be employed. Statement (d) concludes the monotonicity properties of the alloca-
tion. Wedges in (e) are direct consequences of the fact that, in our model, only downward
incentive constraints matter.
5 The Shape of Efficient Child Care Subsidies
As we have seen in Section 2, the existing child care subsidy scheme is rather complex.
First, it involves only a partial coverage of formal child care costs. Second, the coverage
is nonlinear: The subsidy has a formal child care expenditure cap above which the sub-
sidy rate is reduced to zero. Third, the subsidy rate decreases with labor income. We are
interested in understanding whether such features are optimal.
In this section, we propose a non-linear transfer and subsidy scheme that implements
the constrained efficient allocation in a decentralized economy. We note that while As-
sumptions 2 and 3 are sufficient conditions that allow us to analytically characterize the
optimal allocations, we do not need to impose those assumptions for our implementation
exercise. The proposed implementation is more general and prevents both upward and
downward deviations in the global problem.
5.1 Child Care Wedges and ’Joint Deviations’
As indicated in (6), point (e) of Proposition 2, it is optimal to have the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and child care lower than the return to child care (in
consumption terms) for certain agents. Such discrepancies are known as wedges in public
finance. If agents could freely choose child care (that is not necessarily socially optimal),
wedges would be eliminated. A typical way to preserve a wedge is to use a tax policy. In
our case, a positive subsidy on child care would reduce the privately perceived return to
child care and generate a wedge qualitatively similar to that described above (in Proposi-
tion 2 (e)). In our framework, however, the relationship between the wedge and the optimal
subsidy on child care is not so straightforward. Instead, we show that the optimal subsidy
must be kinked as a function of the level of formal child care cost, very much in line with
the qualitative features of the existing scheme in the US. An agent whose expenditure on
formal child care is lower than the kink point faces a subsidy while it is optimal to set the
subsidy to zero (or even to perhaps impose a positive tax) for formal child care cost above
the kink-point.
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The reason why the connection between wedges and taxes breaks down in our frame-
work is as follows. The wedge (6) is calculated by figuring out the shadow return to child
care of an agent who produces the socially optimal quantities as a function of her skills. Set-
ting the subsidy equal to this wedge eliminates the agent’s desire to provide suboptimal
child care when she produces the socially optimal quantities associated with her z type. However,
in a market economy with taxes, an agent might find it optimal to adopt a joint deviation of
producing a different amount and adjusting the level of child care provided. An optimal
tax and subsidy schedule has to be designed so as to deter such joint deviations.
In order to more formally grasp the economic forces shaping child care subsidies in our
framework, consider the ’local’ wedge as in (6):
WE(zi|zi) := 1− 1ωv
′
(
y∗ (zi)
zi
+ h∗(zi)
)
.
Let h∗(zi) < 1. Suppose that the government is able to induce agent zi to produce y∗(zi).
WE(zi|zi) ≥ 0, hence, represents a necessary condition for the agent to choose h∗(zi).
Setting marginal income tax rates equal to the labor wedges (5) and marginal child
care subsidy rates equal to the child care wedges WE(zi|zi), however, will not be enough
to implement the constrained optimum. This is because those who tell the truth about
their type are not the only ones who would want to increase h. In fact, higher types who
declare to be of a type σ = zi will have even greater incentives to overprovide h (while also
engaging in suboptimal market work). In particular, consider agent zi+1 declaring to be of
type zi. The ‘joint deviation wedge’ for this agent is given by:
WE(zi|zi+1) := 1− 1ωv
′
(
y∗ (zi)
zi+1
+ h∗(zi)
)
.
Clearly WE(zi|zi+1) > WE(zi|zi), that is, agents of type zi+1 > zi face a joint deviation
child care wedge that is larger than the child care wedge for a true-telling agent of type zi.
In other words, if we were to set the child care subsidy rate to WE(zi|zi), then agent zi+1
pretending to be of type zi and producing the recommended level of income y∗(zi) for this
declaration, finds it optimal to increase h beyond h∗(zi). This is problematic since, as shown
in Lemma 1, the LDIC is binding at the optimal allocation. This implies that, whenever the
child care subsidy rate is set equal to WE(zi|zi), agent zi+1 finds it strictly more advan-
tageous to declare σ = zi, produce y∗(zi) and choose h > h∗(zi) compared to declaring
the truth (and choosing the recommended values (y∗(zi+1), h∗(zi+1)) for his type). These
complications are even stronger when non-local DIC are binding, a non-pathological fea-
ture of the optimal allocation in our multidimensional choice setting. For the purpose of
implementing a second best allocation, it is therefore important to consider the possibility
of joint deviations in declaring a different type σ and engaging in a non-optimal level of h.
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A Graphical Representation of the Optimal Child Care Subsidy Schedule The rational
behind the qualitative shape of the efficient subsidy scheme can be seen graphically as fol-
lows. Recall that V∗ (σ|z) is the value for agent z of declaring σ according to the constrained
efficient allocation:
V∗ (σ|z) := c∗ (σ)− v
(
y∗ (σ)
z
+ h∗ (σ)
)
,
where (c∗(σ), y∗(σ), h∗(σ)) are the constrained optimal allocations associated with type σ.
Second best optimal net taxes are given by:
T∗ (σ) = y∗ (σ)− c∗ (σ)−ω (1− h∗ (σ)) .
Suppose now that agents can privately choose which type to declare, σ ∈ Z, as well as
household provided child care. Taking the second best optimal y∗ (σ) and T∗ (σ) as given,
an agent z therefore chooses σ and h so as to maximize her private utility:
max
σ,h
y∗ (σ)− T∗ (σ)−ω (1− h)+︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
−v
(
y∗ (σ)
z
+ h
)
. (7)
If each agent who reports σ engages in the constrained efficient level of household child
care associated with type σ (i.e., h = h∗ (σ)), then incentive compatibility would imply that
all agents would reveal their true type. A necessary condition for this to happen is that the
agent faces a subsidy that solves her first order condition with respect to household child
care at h∗ (σ). We would thus require a subsidy rate equal to the joint deviation child care
wedge at h = h∗ (σ). Let s (σ|z) be such a rate:
s (σ|z) = WE (σ|z) := 1− 1
ω
v′
(
y∗ (σ)
z
+ h∗ (σ)
)
.
Hence, we have:
(1− s (σ|z))ω− v′
(
y∗ (σ)
z
+ h∗ (σ)
)
= 0.
We illustrate the private problem (7) of an agent of type z declaring to be of type σ in
Panel (a) of Figure 2. In the absence of child care subsidies, the slope of the budget con-
straint, c = y∗ (σ) − T∗ (σ) − ω (1− h), is equal to the cost of formal child care ω. The
agent engages in household child care h (σ|z) ∈ (0, 1) given by the tangency point be-
tween the agent’s indifference curve and budget constraint at point A. To implement the
constrained optimum, we need to induce any agent who delcares σ to choose the con-
strained optimal household child care, h∗ (σ). A child care subsidy rate set equal to the
joint deviation wedge of the agent at h∗ (σ) ensures that the slope of the budget constraint
becomes (1− s (σ|z))ω. Agent z declaring σ will therefore choose h∗ (σ) at point B.
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Figure 2: U(c, h, σ|z) corresponds to the objective function in (7). Panel (a): In the absence of
child care subsidies, agent z declaring σ engages in household child care level h (σ|z), given by the
tangency point between the agent’s indifference curve and the agent’s budget constraint at point
A. A hypothetical child care subsidy rate set equal to the joint deviation wedge of the agent at h∗ (σ)
would ensure that an agent z declaring σ will choose h∗ (σ) at point B. Such hypothetical subsidy
rate is infeasible as it would depend on the true type z, which is not observed. Panel (b): A subsidy
rate that is set equal to the maximum joint deviation wedge s (σ|zN) = WE (σ|zN) when h ≥ h∗ (σ)
and to the minimum joint deviation wedge s (σ|z2) = WE (σ|z2) when h < h∗ (σ), ensures that any
agent declaring to be of type σ chooses the optimal level of household child care h∗ (σ) . An example
of such a scheme is depicted by the solid line budget constraint with a kink at h∗ (σ).
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This hypothetical subsidy scheme is, however, infeasible since the subsidy rates are
dependent on the true type z of the agent, which is nonobservable. We therefore need to
design a subsidy scheme that does not rely on observing z. Suppose that, as in Figure 2(a),
in the absence of child care subsidies, an agent z reporting σ has incentive to engage in
h > h∗ (σ). Such deviation, would be discouraged by setting the subsidy rate equal to the
joint deviation wedge of highest type zN:
WE(σ|zN) = 1− 1
ω
v′
(
y∗ (σ)
zN
+ h∗ (σ)
)
.
Since WE (σ|zN) ≥ WE (σ|z) for all z, no z declaring σ would ever choose h above
h∗ (σ). Symmetrically, setting a subsidy rate equal to WE(σ|z2) guarantees that each agent
z reporting σ has an incentive to choose h ≤ h∗ (σ). Such a scheme is illustrated by the solid
line kinked budget constraint in Panel (b) of Figure 2. The scheme displays a kink-point
at h∗(σ). At point B in Figure 2(b), the steeper segment of the kinked budget constraint
is tangent to the indifference curve for agent z2 while the flatter segment of the kinked
budget constraint is tangent to the indifference curve for agent zN. Since the indifference
curve of any z reporting σ would lie in between the indifference curves associated with z2
and zN at the kink point, any agent reporting σ would choose h∗ (σ). This principle is used
in Proposition 3, where we also show that z2 can be replaced by the productivity level of
the highest unemployed type.
5.2 Implementation
We first discuss an implementation that relies on direct mechanism and subsequently map
our proposed implementation using a version of the taxation principle.
Recall that for any real number x, we adopt the notation x+ := max{0, x} and x− :=
min{x, 0}. Let Z∗0 := {z ∈ Z | y∗(z) = 0} denote the set of types pooled into unemploy-
ment, and z¯0 := max{z2, max Z∗0} the highest type between z2 and the unemployed.
Proposition 3 Let f ∗(σ) := ω(1− h∗(σ)) be the optimal formal child care cost associated with
the optimal h∗(σ). The following subsidy rates and transfers implement the constrained optimum.
(a) For employed agents, we have:
If σ /∈ Z∗0 , then s (σ, f ) =

(
1− 1ωv′
(
y∗(σ)
zN
+ h∗(σ)
))+
i f f ≤ f ∗ (σ) ;(
1− 1ωv′
(
y∗(σ)
z¯0
+ h∗(σ)
))−
i f f > f ∗ (σ) .
(b) For unemployed agents, the subsidy rate is zero: If σ ∈ Z∗0 , then s (σ, f ) = 0 ∀ f .
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(c) For all σ ∈ Z, the optimal transfer scheme is set as follows:
T (σ) = y∗(σ)− c∗ (σ)− f ∗ (σ) + s (σ, f ∗ (σ)) f ∗ (σ) ;
where c∗ (·) and y∗ (·) are the consumption and income functions of the second best allocation.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The identification of the type z¯0 permits one to minimize the subsidy rates in the second
segment of the subsidy schedule while analytically guaranteeing the implementation of the
second best. The operators x+ and x− have a similar aim. They imply that the child care
subsidy rate is set to zero whenever such zero rate is ‘analytically sufficient’ to implement
the second best. We further note that for employed agents, if f ∗(σ) = ω, then only the
subsidy rates associated with the first segment f ≤ f ∗(σ) are relevant. Similarly, if f ∗(σ) =
0, then only the subsidy rates associated with the second segment f > f ∗(σ) are relevant.
As described above, child care subsidies in Statement (a) ensure that each agent declar-
ing σ chooses the optimal level of formal child care cost associated with σ, f ∗ (σ), no matter
what her true type is. In particular, the first (second) segment ensures that agents will not
want to overprovide (underprovide) household child care, analogous to the principle il-
lustrated in Figure 2. From Statement (c), income transfers are then adjusted to yield the
same consumption to agents as in the constrained optimum: c∗(σ) = y∗(σ)− T(σ)− (1−
s(σ, f ∗(σ)) f ∗(σ). Since agents earn the same and receive the same consumption levels as
in the second best optimum, such allocations are incentive compatible and also satisfy the
government budget constraint.
Statement (b) deals with child care subsidies offered to the unemployed. Since market
productivities are irrelevant for the unemployed, they are all the same and there are no
incentives problem among them. There is therefore no need to subsidize child care of the
unemployed.
The implementation is straightforward in the sense that we do not need to compute who
deviates where and by how much. In other words, we do not need to compute all joint
deviation wedges: The proposed kinked subsidy schedule, based on the joint deviation
wedges associated with zN and z¯0, ensures that no agent would deviate from the optimal
child care level. The child care subsidies are conditional on formal child care cost being
verifiable.
The optimal subsidy rates and transfers schedule englobes features that match the qual-
itative features of the US system, that is, a cap on formal child care costs and subsidy rates
that decrease with earnings for formal child care costs below the cap. We propose such a
scheme using a variation of the taxation principle below.
To be able to describe the subsidy rates and transfer scheme as only a function of in-
come, we need an additional monotonicity assumption. We abuse in notation and indicate
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by f (y) the formal child care level associated with income y. For all values of y such that
there is a σy: y = y∗(σy), we associate f (y) = f ∗(σy). Unfortunately, such mapping does
not deliver a well-defined function whenever the optimal allocation associates multiple
values of f to one y. We will hence assume a well-defined function f (·).
Assumption 4 Let Y = {y ∈ R+|∃z ∈ Z : y = y∗(z)} be the set of equilibrium income values,
and for all y ∈ Y define f (y) := f ∗(σy). Assume that f (·) is single valued.
As we will see in Section 6.2, f turns out to be non-decreasing in y in all of our numerical
simulations. For practical purposes, we can extend the domain of f (·) toR+ so as to obtain
a weakly monotone (piecewise constant) function. For y ≥ 0, y /∈ Y , we set f (y) = f (m(y))
where m(y) := max {yˆ ∈ Y|yˆ ≤ y}. The consumption function is analogously constructed:
c(y) = c(m(y)), where for all y ∈ Y , c(y) = c∗(σy).
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 4, there is a T ∈ R such that the following subsidy rates and
transfers implement the constrained optimum.
(a) For employed agents (who earn y > 0), we have:
s (y, f ) =

(
1− 1ωv′
(
y
zN
+ 1− f (y)ω
))+
i f f ≤ f (y) ;(
1− 1ωv′
(
y
z¯0
+ 1− f (y)ω
))−
i f f > f (y) ;
If y ∈ Y , then T (y) = y− c (y)− f (y) + s (y, f (y)) f (y) ; Otherwise, T (y) = T.
(b) For unemployed agents (with y = 0), the second best allocation is implemented by having:
s(0, f ) ≡ 0, and T(0) = −c (0)− f (0) .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that when f (y) = ω, the child care subsidies for the employed with f < f (y)
follow a sliding scale pattern, that is, they decrease with labor earnings. To see this, suppose
that productivity type zN produces a lower output than the optimal one associated with
her type (i.e., she is mimicking a low income earner). In this case, type zN has an incentive
to engage in higher than optimal household child care. The lower the mimicked output,
the higher the non-local child care deviation incentives for type zN. Thus, higher child care
subsidies are paid to lower income earners to counterbalance such incentives.
In our implementation, labor wedges and marginal taxes on income do not coincide.
Using the private first order condition of the agent with respect to y, evaluated at the
agent’s optimal formal child care cost choice f (y), we obtain:
T′(y) = 1− 1
z
v′
(
y
z
+ 1− f (y)
ω
)
+ s′y(y, f (y)) f (y) . (8)
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When s′y(y, f ) ≤ 0, since f (y) ≥ 0, our implementation implies a marginal income tax that
is no greater than the labor wedge.18 This observation might contribute to the debate over
the optimality of imposing a negative marginal income tax rate on low income earners.
The debate has focused on the possibility of having negative labor wedges whenever there is
a strong desire to redistribute towards low skilled individuals (Chone´ and Laroque, 2011;
Saez, 2002a). As we saw in Section 2 (in Figure 1, panel (c)), only low income working
mothers face negative marginal taxes in the US system. At the same time, they also face
child care subsidies that decrease with earnings. Equation (8) indicates that when child
care subsidies follows a sliding scale, optimal negative marginal taxes can be compatible
with positive labor wedges.
Child Allowances In order to implement the second best allocation in a way that is com-
patible with the current US income tax schedule, we specify optimal income dependent
child allowances. Let Ta(y) denote net taxes faced by a childless individual earning y in
the actual US tax and benefit system (the corresponding schedule is the dashed line T0 in
Panel (c) of Figure 1). As described in Section 2, the existing child allowances Aa(·) include
child related federal income tax exemptions and EITC if employed, and TANF benefits if
unemployed (this schedule corresponds to the solid line in Panel (c) of Figure 1).
We take the general income tax scheme for the childless Ta(y) as given and keep it fixed.
The optimal child care subsidy rates s(y, f ) from Proposition 4, together with the optimal child
allowances, A(y), implement the constrained optimum, where child allowances are defined as:
A(y) := Ta(y)− T(y),
and T(y) are the total optimal transfers from Proposition 4.19 It is straightforward to see
that since child care subsidy rates are the same as in Proposition 4, agents would engage
the optimal level of formal child care. In addition, since T(y) = Ta(y)− A(y), Proposition
4 implies that consumption and utility would also be the same as under the second best.
6 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we present a quantitative analysis based on our framework. We focus on
single mothers with at least one child aged below 6 and calibrate our model to match
features of the US labor market. We then simulate our optimal policy results and quantify
18Note that the function s(y, f ) is not differentiable in y at f = f (y). For all practical purposes, we can
focus on the initial segment of the subsidy rate schedule, where cost of formal child care is below f (y).
19Note that this does not imply redistribution from the childless to parents but rather that one can keep
the current income tax for the childless fixed and partially reform the system for parents through child al-
lowances.
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the optimal child care subsidies and child allowances. We also numerically analyse the
optimal program allowing for income effects.
6.1 Calibration
We consider the following preferences:
U(c, e) =
c1−α − κ
1− α −
1
θ
e1+γ
1+ γ
,
where 1γ represents the wage elasticity of labor supply. We consider quasi-linear prefer-
ences with α = 0 and κ = 0 (Besley and Coate, 1995 and Kleven et al., 2009) as well as
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) preferences with α = 1 and κ = 1 (Guner et al.,
2014).20
We have the remaining parameters to calibrate: The preference parameters γ and θ,
the probability of facing adverse labor market conditions pi(0), the distribution of market
productivities pi(z)when z > 0, the child care needs normalized to one unit of effort (which
corresponds to choosing a normalization for effort e), the cost of formal child care ω, and
the amount of net resources allocated to single mothers M under the current US system.
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values and relevant moments used for calibration.
Wage Elasticity From our utility specification, the labor supply elasticity is given by 1γ .
Following the literature on wage elasticity among women (see Heckman and Macurdy,
1980 and Blundell et al., 1993), we set γ = 1 corresponding to an elasticity of 1. We also con-
duct sensitivity analysis by considering a more conservative elasticity of 0.5, corresponding
to preference parameter γ = 2 (Chetty et al., 2011).
CPS data To calibrate effort cost parameter θ as well as the distribution of market pro-
ductivities, we make use of March 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) data. We limit
the sample to single mothers aged between 18 and 50, and who have at least one child aged
below 6. Table 2 reports summary statistics for our sample of single mothers. On average,
our mothers tend to have 1.28 children aged below 6 and 1.95 children aged below 18. 56%
of mothers worked and employed mothers on average worked 1,519 hours a year.
Adverse labor market conditions We specify the probability, pi (0), of people suffering
from adverse labor market conditions (z1 = 0) as the proportion of involuntarily unem-
ployed mothers in our CPS sample. The involuntarily unemployed include those who
20We also considered CRRA specification with α = 2 (Bick, 2016; Domeij and Klein, 2012), which yielded
similar qualitative results with minor quantitative differences. We do not report results from that specification
for the sake of conciseness.
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Table 1: Baseline Parametrization
Parameter Value Moments to match Source
γ 1 Wage elasticity of labor supply 1 Heckman and Macurdy (1980)
Blundell et al. (1993)
θ See Table 3 Average hours of work CPS 2010
pi (0) 11% Prop. involuntarily unemployed CPS 2010
pi(z) See Figure 3 Empirical distribution of wages CPS 2010
e = 1 24 hours Hours of non family child care Rosenbaum and Ruhm (2007)
per week Laughlin (2010)
ω $5.10 Average hourly child care cost Child Care Aware of America (2012)
M See Table 3 Net transfers to single mothers Federal and SS Tax, EITC
DCTC, CCDF, TANF
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean s.d. Variable Mean s.d.
Age 28.3 7.29 Proportion in good health 0.89 0.31
High school graduate 0.33 0.47 Proportion working 0.56 0.50
College or university 0.44 0.50 Yearly hours of work (if > 0) 1,519 749
No. of children under 6 1.28 0.55 Wage per hour (if > 0) 14.5 0.49
No. of children under 18 1.95 1.10 Out of the labor force 0.32 0.46
Proportion White 0.66 0.47
Proportion Black 0.25 0.43 No. of observations 3,211
Source: March 2010 CPS data on single women with at least one child aged below 6.
lost their jobs and those who entered or re-entered the labor force but could not get a job.
This definition excludes those who voluntarily left their jobs or are out of the labor force.
Around 11% of mothers with children under 6 were involuntarily unemployed and repre-
sent our mass of people suffering from adverse labor market conditions.
Empirical distribution of productivities In our model, individuals have heterogeneous
market productivities when working outside of the house. We interpret market produc-
tivity types z > 0 as hourly wages when agents are not involuntarily unemployed. A
standard approach to calibrating the skills distribution in the literature has been to fit a
smooth function (typically log normal with upper Pareto tail) on empirical wages of the
employed (Mankiw et al., 2009). This approach, however, does not consider the skills dis-
tribution among the voluntarily unemployed, which we interpret as those who voluntarily
left their jobs or are out of the labor force.
In our framework, agents can be voluntarily unemployed if their wage is lower than
their reservation wage which, in our model, depends on formal child care cost as well
as the actual US tax and benefit system. In particular, we care about the potential wage
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distribution of mothers who would have worked if they did not have child care needs or
faced a more generous child care subsidy scheme. This is because while it may be privately
optimal for them not to work given the current real world situation, it may be efficient for
some of them to work in the optimal program. We, therefore, impute the potential wage
distribution of the voluntarily unemployed using two step selection correction methods a`
la Heckman. The empirical strategy is reported in Appendix B.
Figure 3 illustrates the wage distribution of mothers conditional on not being unlucky,
pi (z) for z > 0. The wage distribution of the employed is based on their actual hourly
wages, which are computed as yearly gross earnings divided by total hours of work in
one year. The potential wage distribution of voluntarily unemployed mothers has been
imputed. In the numerical exercise, we discretize the wage space into 50 wage centiles
ranging between $2.40 to $32.21 such that we have 2% of mothers within each centile.
Wage Distribution
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Figure 3: March 2010 Current Population Survey data on women with at least one child aged below
6. Wages for non working mothers are imputed using Heckman selection correction methods.
Child care needs Data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation indicates
that on average, preschool age children spent 16 hours per week in the care of grandparents
and other relatives (Rosenbaum and Ruhm, 2007; Laughlin, 2010). We interpret child care
needs as the amount of child care time that can be substituted for paid care.21 Given a
normal working week of 40 hours and family provided care of 16 hours per week, mothers
21The literature tends to incorporate paid child care as a fixed costs of work or by assuming that one hour
of work requires one hour of paid child care (Blundell and Shephard, 2012; Domeij and Klein, 2012; Guner
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need to make alternative child care arrangements for the remaining 24 hours per week. We,
therefore, calibrate our model such that one unit of effort is equal to 24 hours per week. We
also perform sensitivity analysis where we use a normalization of 34 hours corresponding
to a 50 hour working week minus family provided care of 16 hours per week.
Child care cost To calibrate average hourly cost of formal child care ω, we use the 2010
US average cost which ranged between $6,380 for a four year old in family care homes and
$9,520 for an infant in child care centres (Child Care Aware of America, 2012).22 Assuming
that full time child care corresponds to 50 weeks of 40 hours each, average hourly cost is
$3.98 per child. Since single mothers have on average 1.28 children under age 6, we set
ω = $5.10. As sensitivity check, we also consider a higher ω = $6.40, corresponding to
formal child care cost of $10,000 per year for one child in full time day care.
Calibration of effort cost We calibrate the parameter θ such that, given the 2010 US tax
and benefit system and the selection corrected empirical distribution of wages, the average
hours of work predicted from our model match the average hours of work observed in the
CPS sample. The private problem of an agent with effort cost parameter θ is given by
max
{c,l,h}
c1−α − κ
1− α −
1
θ
e1+γ
1+ γ
(9)
s.t.
c = y− TE (y, f )− f ,
where effort e = l + h, earnings y = zl, and formal child care cost f = ω (1− h). TE (y, f )
are actual net taxes faced by a working mother: Federal and SS Taxes, EITC, DCTC and
CCDF benefits.We elaborate on this stage of the calibration process in Appendix B. The
calibrated θ for different child care needs, child care cost and labor supply elasticity are
reported in Table 3.
Calibration of net transfers Since our analysis is focused on single mothers with children
aged below 6 and the US welfare system tends to be generous towards them, we also need
to calibrate the amount of net transfers, M, already allocated to them in the US budget.
In other words, we take as given the current generosity of the US towards single mothers.
M is therefore a weighted sum of unemployment benefits, and of EITC, DCTC and CCDF
benefits net of Federal and SS taxes when the mother is employed. The weights are given
et al., 2014). Our child care modelling is closer to Bick (2016) who also allows for the possibility of unpaid
household child care as a genuinely separate margin from labor supply.
22State wide average annual costs for a four year old (infant) in full time centre based care ranged between
$3,900 ($4,600) in Mississippi and $11,700 ($15,000) in Massachusetts.
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by the probability distribution of mothers across z types. We interpret unemployment
benefits as inclusive of the TANF and set the benefits such that, given the US tax and
benefit system, the proportion of working mothers predicted by our model matches the
proportion of working mothers (56%) in our CPS sample. We elaborate on this stage of
the calibration process in Appendix B. The calibrated values of M for different child care
needs, child care cost and labor supply elasticity are reported in Table 3.
Table 3: Calibrated Effort Cost Parameter and Net Transfers
Baseline 1e = 34 ω = 6.4 γ = 2 CRRA
θ 1.27 0.88 1.27 1.77 1.39
M $4,617 $5,015 $4900 $4,627 $5,256
Note: θ is calibrated such that, given the 2010 US tax and benefit system and the distribution of
wages, the average hours of work predicted from our model match the average hours of work
observed for single mothers with at least one child under 6 in 2010 CPS. Baseline quasi-linear pref-
erences with 1e = 24, ω = $5.1 and γ = 1. In sensitivity analysis, we recalibrate θ and M by varying
the parameter of reference while keeping the other ones at the baseline level.
Model validity We have made several assumptions while calibrating our model. The
main assumptions include the use of the wage distribution to model the distribution of
market productivity and our model implication that people with employment opportuni-
ties and wages above the reservation wage would work. As an external validity check,
we compute the employment elasticity implied by our model based on the proportion of
women who would leave employment as a result of a 2% increase in the cost of formal
child care. According to our calibrated baseline model, the employment elasticity with re-
spect to the cost of child care is -0.83, which lies within the average range of child care price
elasticities estimated in the literature.23
Social Welfare Criterion In line with the literature, we consider a concave and increasing
social welfare function (Kleven et al., 2009; Piketty and Saez, 2013). The welfare function is
analogous to the one discussed in Section 4:
Wˆ(c, e; ρ) :=
(
N
∑
i=1
pi(zi)[U(ci, ei)]ρ
) 1
ρ
.
For our benchmark case with quasi-linear utility, we consider a moderate desire for
redistribution by assuming a logarithmic welfare function (ρ = 0). By taking the derivative
23Employment elasticities with respect to cost of child care for US single mothers with children aged below
6 range from -0.5 (Han and Waldfogel, 2001) to -1.29 (Connelly and Kimmel, 2003).
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with respect to c at the optimal allocation, we recover the (here endogenous) social welfare
weights:
φ∗(zi) :=
1
V∗(zi|zi) =
1
c∗ (zi)− 1θ e
∗(zi)1+γ
1+γ
.
Although the sufficient condition stated in Assumption 3 is possibly not satisfied by
the social weighting function φ∗, a simple Corollary of Lemma 1 suggests the following
algorithm. Compute the optimal allocation of the relaxed problem with only (local and
non-local) downward constraints. If the LDIC are satisfied with equality, all upward con-
straints are also satisfied and all properties of Lemma 1 hold. We describe the numerical
algorithm in Appendix B.4.
We also consider several other social welfare criteria in sensitivity analysis. First, we
consider the Ralwsian criterion (ρ = −∞) with quasi-linear utility, where the welfare of the
unemployed is maximized. Second, we consider the full utilitarian social welfare criterion
(ρ = 1) with CRRA preferences. This criterion maps into our main specification with quasi-
linear preferences and endogenous social welfare weights: φ∗(z) := c∗(z)−α.
Finally, we consider Pareto improving reforms using quasi-linear preferences and wel-
fare criterion with ρ = 0, which is comparable to our baseline specification. In particular,
we solve the government problem as before except that we impose the additional con-
straints that each agent type gets at least as much utility as under the actual US tax and
benefit system. We also consider Pareto improving reforms using quasi-linear preferences
and welfare criterion with ρ = 0.99, which presumes a lower desire for redistribution.24
6.2 Results
Constrained Optimal Allocations
Results for the constrained optimum with quasi-linear preferences and logarithmic social
welfare are illustrated in the top panels of Figure 4. The solid lines illustrate the baseline
case with a labor supply elasticity of one γ = 1, a normalization of one unit of effort set
equal to twenty four hours 1e = 24, and cost of formal child care of ω = $5.10 per hour. As
sensitivity analysis, we recalibrate θ and M by varying, respectively, labor supply elasticity
to 0.5 corresponding to γ = 2, the normalisation to 1e = 34, and the cost of formal child
care to ω = $6.40, while keeping the other parameters at the baseline level.
In the bottom panels of Figure 4, we report results for the specification with quasi-linear
preferences and Rawlsian social welfare, and for the specification with CRRA preferences
and utilitarian social welfare. We also report the Pareto improving optimal allocations with
quasi-linear preferences and social welfare functions with ρ = 0 and ρ = 0.99.
24We also performed simulations for intermediate values of ρ ∈ (0, 0.99), which yielded intermediate
results between the two specifications reported.
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In all specifications, optimal earnings (y) and consumption (c) increase with market
productivity (z), as can be seen from Panels (a)-(b) and (d)-(e) of Figure 4. Comparing
the baseline earnings (solid line) in Panel (a) to the CRRA earnings (dashed-dotted line)
in Panel (d), we also see that the earnings profile is flatter under CRRA than under linear
felicity. This is consistent with it being harder to incentivize the labor supply of higher pro-
ductivity agents compared to lower productivity agents in the presence of income effects.
As expected, unemployed mothers are pooled with the same consumption and house-
hold child care within a given specification. Single mothers with low productivity are
engaged in higher levels of household child care compared to the baseline case when the
cost of formal child care is high (ω = $6.40), when labor supply is more inelastic (γ = 2),
and when we have CRRA preferences, as can be seen from Panels (c) and (f).
Working mothers tend not to engage in household child care activities (h = 0). Across
all specifications and productivity levels, we have only five cases where mothers work on
the labor market and also engage in household child care activities: The productivity type
z = 5.88 in the specification with normalization 1e = 34, and four productivity types,
z = $7.21− $7.71, in the specification with high formal child care cost (ω = 6.40).
Comparison with the US
We compare the optimal earnings and utilities with those that may be obtained under the
US tax and benefit system in Figure 5. We focus on the optimal allocations obtained from
the baseline and from the Pareto improving specifications for the sake of conciseness.
The solid lines in Figure 5 illustrate the optimal allocations obtained from the baseline
specification. In Panels (a) and (b), the circles represent the imputed allocation and utilities
implied by the actual US tax and benefit system under the baseline specification. More
precisely, to get the allocations implied by the US system, we simulate the choice of single
mothers taking into account federal and SS taxes, EITC, TANF, DCTC and CCDF as per
the agent’s problem (9). We also report the imputed allocation and utilities from the sim-
ulations assuming that child care subsidies are zero (i.e., inclusive of federal and SS taxes,
EITC and TANF, but without CCDF or DCTC), as illustrated by the crosses.25
The disincentive effects of not providing any child care subsidy on labor supply can
be seen clearly from Panel (a) of Figure 5, where a higher proportion of mothers do not
work.26 In the optimal scheme, a higher proportion of mothers (10% more) work relative to the
US system. The optimal scheme also provides higher utility to low productivity mothers
as can be seen from Panel (b). Similar patterns emerge when we compare the Pareto im-
25In order to have a meaningful comparison, all reported specifications have the same value of net trans-
fers M = $4, 617. The government budget ‘net cost savings’ from not providing child care subsidies were
reallocated equally across all types as consumption in the specification without child care subsidies.
26To see this, note that a greater proportion of mothers have zero earnings in the zero subsidy case (crosses)
compared to the baseline case (solid line).
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Comparison with Allocations under 2010 US Tax and Benefit System
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Figure 5: The solid lines represent the optimal allocation according the baseline case with loga-
rithmic welfare objective. The circles represent the simulated allocation obtained from solving the
agent problem (9) given the US tax and benefit scheme for mothers with two children below 13 and
inclusive of the CCDF and DCTC. The crosses in Panels (a) and (b) represent the simulated allo-
cation obtained from assuming that the agent faces the US tax and benefit scheme but with child
care subsidy rates set to zero (i.e., inclusive of federal and SS taxes, EITC and TANF, but without
CCDF or DCTC). In Panels (c) and (d), the dashed and dotted lines represent the Pareto improving
allocations with welfare criterion with ρ = 0 and ρ = 0.99 respectively. The graphs are truncated at
wage $22.5 for emphasis (we omit the two highest wage bins of $25.64 and $32.21).
proving earnings and utilities to the ones implied by the US system in Panels (c) and (d).
The incentive issues at hand suggest that child care subsidies may encourage labor sup-
ply, especially among low productivity types near the extensive margin of participation.
Comparing the optimal earnings to those of the US, we also see that the intensive margin
incentives from the optimal allocations are milder for low productivity types but stronger
for high productivity types.
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Earnings Related Transfers and Child Care Subsidies
Table 4 reports the optimal child care subsidy rates for employed mothers according to the
implementation proposed in Proposition 4. We report the subsidy rates corresponding to
the first segment of the schedule, when f ≤ f (y):
s (y, f ) =
1− v′
(
y
zN
+ 1− f (y)ω
)
ωu′ (c(y))
+ . (10)
As noted above, across all specifications, we have only 5 cases with y > 0 and 0 < f (y) <
ω. The optimal subsidy rate associated with the second part of the kink when f > f (y)
was zero in all 5 cases; this shape is representable by a ‘cap’ (at the optimal level of formal
child care) such as the existing one in the US. For all other cases, f (y) = ω so that only the
rate in the first segment is relevant.
As can be seen from column (2) of Table 4 , the optimal subsidy rates for the baseline
specification start from 80% and decrease towards zero for earnings of $30,000 or above.
The optimal subsidy rates decrease more steeply than the US ones (DCTC and CCDF). This qual-
itative feature is robust across welfare criteria and parametric specifications, as can be seen
from the remaining columns. Comparing Columns (2), (6), (8) and (9), we note that the
subsidy rates pertaining to the specifications with logarithmic and Rawlsian social welfare
functions, and to the Pareto improving specifications are virtually the same for income lev-
els below $25,000. This is not surprising given that, in these cases, the employed always
choose f (y) = ω. Those specifications adopt the same quasi-linear preferences such that,
from equation (10), the optimal subsidy rates are the same for the same level of earnings.
The subsidy rates are more variable across the other specifications, with generally higher
optimal subsidy rates for the specifications with high formal child care cost (ω = $6.40) and
with more inelastic labor supply (γ = 2), where the (non-local) child care deviation incen-
tives may be higher.27 Column (7) indicates that the subsidy schedule decreases even more
steeply in the CRRA specification. This is intuitive from equation (10): Since consumption
increases with earnings, the marginal utility of consumption in the denominator decreases
and the subsidy rates thus decrease faster relative to the quasi-linear utility case.
In Table 5, we report the marginal income tax rates corresponding to equation (8), which
takes into account the labor wedges and the marginal child care subsidies. For f (y) = ω,
27We note that child care subsidy rate is lower at $5,000 for the specification with ω = $6.40. This is
because working mothers also provide household child care at that earnings level. As the optimal household
child care is positive (and not zero), the margin of deviation for mimickers in terms of higher than optimal
household child care is tighter and lower subsidy rates are needed to counteract such incentives.
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Table 4: Child Care Subsidy Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Earnings USA Baseline 1e = 34 ω = 6.4 γ = 2 Rawls CRRA ρ = 0 ρ = 0.99
$5,000 0.70 0.80 0.80 0.65 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.80
$10,000 0.70 0.60 0.59 0.68 0.93 0.60 0.71 0.60 0.60
$15,000 0.70 0.40 0.39 0.52 0.83 0.40 0.43 0.40 0.40
$20,000 0.53 0.20 0.19 0.36 0.70 0.20 0.08 0.20 0.20
$25,000 0.51 0.01 0 0.20 0.54 0.05 0 0.02 0.03
$30,000 0.31 0 0 0.10 0.33 0.02 0 0 0
$35,000 0.25 0 0 0.02 0.09 0 0 0 0
$40,000 0.22 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0
Note: US subsidy rates in column (1) take into account the DCTC and CCDF. Columns (2) to (5)
report the optimal subsidy rates under quasi-linear preferences and logarithmic social welfare. The
baseline specification in column (2) sets 1e = 24, ω = $5.1 and γ = 1. In sensitivity analysis,
we recalibrate θ and M by varying the parameter of reference while keeping the other ones at the
baseline level. Columns (6) to (9) report, respectively, subsidy rates for the specifications with quasi-
linear preferences and Rawlsian social welfare, CRRA preferences with α = 1 and utilitarian social
welfare, and Pareto improving optimal allocations with quasi-linear preferences and social welfare
with ρ = 0 and ρ = 0.99. Because z is discrete, we do not always observe a z with earnings level
exactly equal to say 5k, 10k, 20k, 25k, 30k, 35k, 40k. We use linear interpolation to approximate the
subsidy rates in between discretized earnings levels where necessary.
Table 5: Marginal Income Tax Rates for Employed Mothers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Earnings USA Baseline 1e = 34 ω = 6.4 γ = 2 Rawls CRRA ρ = 0 ρ = 0.99
$5,000 -0.32 0.24 0.31 0.30 0.19 0.52 0.19 0.05 -0.02
$10,000 -0.32 0.32 0.43 0.32 0.40 0.47 0.39 0.03 -0.09
$15,000 0.08 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.02 0.02
$20,000 0.39 0.29 0.37 0.29 0.34 0.41 0.36 0.31 0.05
$25,000 0.39 0.33 0.39 0.34 0.39 0.42 0.33 0.35 0.05
$50,000 0.23 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.33 0.08 0.25 0.05
$75,000 0.33 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.13 0.26 0 0.20 0.04
$100,000 0.33 0.17 0.17 0.17 0 0.18 0 0.14 0.03
Note: US taxes in column (1) take into account Federal and SS tax rates as well as the EITC rates.
The remaining columns reports the adjusted optimal marginal income tax rates (MTR) for differ-
ent income levels, computed as the sum of the labor wedges and marginal child care subsidies.
Columns (2) to (5) report the MTR under quasi-linear preferences and logarithmic social welfare.
The baseline specification in column (2) sets 1e = 24, ω = $5.1 and γ = 1. In sensitivity analy-
sis, we recalibrate θ and M by varying the parameter of reference while keeping the other ones at
the baseline level. Columns (6) to (9) report, respectively, MTR for the specifications with quasi-
linear preferences and Rawlsian social welfare, CRRA preferences with α = 1 and utilitarian social
welfare, and Pareto improving optimal allocations with quasi-linear preferences and social welfare
with ρ = 0 and ρ = 0.99.
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the expression for the marginal tax rate specifies to:
T′(y) = 1− v
′ ( y
z
)
zu′ (c(y))
+ s′y(y,ω)ω.
The labor supply wedges are always positive while the child care subsidies decrease with
income, thereby leading to marginal tax rates that are lower than the labor wedges. Despite
the steeply decreasing subsidy rates for child care costs, optimal marginal tax rates tend to be positive
at all levels of earnings. Thus, even though our child care framework qualitatively allows
for the possibility of negative marginal income taxes, our quantitative exercise does not
indicate an explicit need for such taxes in most specifications.28
As expected, employed agents tend to face higher marginal income tax rates under the
Rawlsian social welfare function. This is consistent with income taxes also playing a redis-
tributive role in our framework. Under the Rawlsian welfare criterion, the welfare of the
worse-off individual (i.e., the unemployed) is what matters. The employed are therefore
taxed (and child care subsidized) to ensure that they are efficiently incentivized for output
production.
Child Allowances
As explained in Section 5.2, the current baseline US tax system does not need to be re-
formed. We keep actual net taxes faced by a single childless individual, Ta(y) (i.e., federal
and SS taxes, EITC, and unemployment benefits), and find the corresponding optimal child
allowances, A(y) = Ta(y)− T(y) that deliver the second best optimal allocation. The US
net income taxes are computed as in Section 2.
The optimal child allowances A (y), optimal child care subsidy rates s (y, f (y)) and net
income taxes Ta(y) are illustrated in Figure 6. We focus on the baseline specification and
on the Pareto improving specifications for the sake of conciseness. Panel (a) illustrates the
optimal child allowances and the US child allowances (i.e., federal income tax exemptions,
EITC and TANF as computed in Section 2). Panel (b) illustrates the optimal child care
subsidy rates and the US child care subsidy rates (i.e., DCTC and CCDF as computed in
Table 4). Panel (c) illustrates the net income taxes faced by single childless individuals
under the US tax system (i.e., Federal and SS Taxes, EITC and unemployment benefits). In
the bottom panels (d) and (e), we report the full graph for child allowances and child care
subsidy rates. The top panels are zoomed for the range of earnings below $42,000.
Qualitatively at least, the US child care subsidy scheme looks very similar to our opti-
28One exception occurs in the Pareto improving social welfare specification with ρ = 0.99, where we have
small labor wedges and negative marginal tax rates for earnings below $15,000. This specification is very
close to one with ρ = 1, which indicates the lowest desire for redistribution across productivity types and
where the laissez-faire allocation solves the government problem.
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mal subsidy scheme with child care subsidy rates declining with earnings as can be seen
from Panel (b). As argued above, the optimal program provides stronger participation in-
centives compared to the US scheme. The intensive margin incentives seem to be milder
(stronger) for those earning below (above) the US median income.29 In particular, for
those earning below $20,000, the child care subsidy schedule is steeper while child care
allowances tend to be flatter than those of the US scheme, especially at lower intermediate
levels of earnings. Conversely, for those earnings above $20,000, the child care subsidy
schedule tends to be flatter while child allowances decrease less steeply (and even increase
in the Pareto improving specification with ρ = 0.99) relative to those in the US scheme.
Finally, note that in the cases of Pareto improving reforms, the pattern of child al-
lowances for low income mothers closely mimic those of the US. Recall that in these cases,
the optimal child care subsidy rates decrease more steeply than those in the US and that
participation is always enhanced in the optimal program (as can be seen from Figure 5).
This suggests that a properly designed child care subsidy schedule alone may be an im-
portant key to incentivizing the labor supply of mothers.
Further Sensitivity Analysis on Wage Bins Since the optimal subsidy rates proposed in
Proposition 4 depends on the productivity level zN, we provide further sensitivity analysis
on the baseline specification, where we vary the number of wage bins to 25, 100, and 500.
We illustrate the optimal child care subsidy rates and child allowances in Appendix Figure
A2. As can be seen from the Figure, the optimal subsidy rates and child allowances do not
vary much across wage bin grids. Further details are available in Appendix B.5.
7 Conclusion and Discussion
We provide an efficiency case for child care subsidies in an optimal heterogeneous agent
welfare design problem. We show that optimal child care subsidy rates follow a sliding
scale and that the coverage rates should contemplate a kink. These features are in line with
the qualitative features of the existing US scheme. Although child care subsidies incen-
tivize higher work participation, the sliding scale pattern may have disincentive effects on
labor supply. To counterbalance such disincentives, marginal labor income taxes are set at
lower rates than the labor wedges.
Overall, we find that the optimal program provides stronger work participation incen-
tives but milder intensive margin incentives compared to the US scheme, especially for
lower income earners. In all specifications considered, optimal child care subsidy rates
decrease with income more steeply than those in the current US scheme. Furthermore, an
29In 2010, the median income for a single mother was $24,370 (US Census, Table F-10).
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interesting feature arises when we consider Pareto improving reforms: Whereas the op-
timal child care subsidy rates stay robust, the optimal child allowances for low income
mothers closely mimic those of the US.
A main achievement of this paper is to formulate a flexible model of the design of child
care subsidies and to derive a number of properties of the optimal scheme. This might
serve to unify a body of literature and to suggest some new results. Despite the complexity
of the resulting screening problem, the solution found is remarkably simple and can be
explained intuitively. The theory that emerges has a non-local nature. While we have used
the assumption of quasilinear preferences for analytical tractability, we have quantitatively
shown that the results carry over with concave preferences.
The model does, however, have a number of limitations. First, we have conducted the
analysis assuming that individuals differ only with respect to their productivities in the
primary labor market. Neither seems particularly realistic, although we do not believe
that this nullifies the value of our analysis. The considerations that we have uncovered
are likely to be important in more general analyses. Second, our assumptions about how
the labor market operates are somewhat restrictive. For example, we have abstracted from
general equilibrium effects. We do, however, share this limitation with most of the litera-
ture on optimal income taxation.
The efficiency case for child care subsidies would still hold for more general non sepa-
rable preference specifications although we may possibly lose the sliding-scale pattern that
we find here. Our model is also extendable to heterogeneous quality choices. It is straight-
forward to see that if quality is verifiable, a non-linear transfer and subsidy scheme that
takes into account quality differences, such as quality related vouchers (Blau, 2003), would
be efficient. The problem would be more complicated if quality is not verifiable since for-
mal child care cost would then be a function of both formal child care usage and quality
usage. Bastani et al. (2013) explore the desirability of a refundable tax credit, tax deductabil-
ity, and public provision of child care in a simple model with two agent’s types. Their main
focus is precisely on motivating parents to choose higher quality child care. Child quality
considerations are an important issue that, we believe, deserves further investigation.
We have also abstracted from dynamic considerations in our model. Following stan-
dard arguments, it can be shown that if z does not change over time, the optimal dynamic
allocation is a repetition of the static one characterized in this paper (Baron and Besanko,
1984; and Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, pp. 299-301). With strictly concave preferences in
consumption and stochastic z, matters become more complicated and the taxation of sav-
ings becomes relevant for redistribution (Abraham et al., 2016; Ho, 2017; Kocherlakota,
2010).
Taking into account the potential human capital accumulation losses or gains from en-
couraging participation may also be interesting. Blundell et al. (2016), for example, find
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that single mothers with basic education earn little or no returns to experience while those
who are more highly educated have significant returns to experience. The fact that the po-
tential gains from incentivizing participation are unequal across skill groups might have
non-trivial implications for the optimal pattern of child care subsidies.
Our model with one agent helps pin point key trade-offs involved in child care within
an optimal welfare problem with heterogenous private market productivities. Extending
the model to two parent households is straightforward if, for example, fathers always work
full-time and there are no income effects. The extension is less straightforward if fathers
have privately observed market productivities and jointly decide on their labor supply
with mothers. In this case, the problem becomes one of multi-dimensional screening and
multi-dimensional choice that would involve jointly designing couple taxation (Kleven et
al., 2009) and child care subsidies. We leave these considerations for future research.
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For Online Publication
A Proofs
For ease of exposition, we report the statement in each Lemma and Proposition from the main text
(in italics) before each proof. We start with a couple of preparatory results.
Claim 1 In an optimal contract, we have y(z1) = 0; and if h (z1) > 0, then it solves
1− 1
ω
v′ (h(z1)) ≥ 0, (A1)
with equality whenever v′(1) ≥ ω. If v′(1) ≤ ω, then h(z1) = 1. In addition, if for some z we have
y (z) = 0, then agent z gets the same allocation as type z1 = 0.
Proof. Since z1 = 0, we must have y(z1) = 0. From the first order conditions of agent z1 = 0 with
respect to c and h, we have v′(h(z1)) ≤ ω. Since v′(0) = 0 and ω > 0, we have h(z1) > 0. If
v′(1) ≤ ω, utility can be increased strictly by increasing h whenever h(z1) < 1; Hence, it must be
that h(z1) = 1. Consider now type z > 0 declaring σ = z1. When y(σ) = 0, all agents have the
same preferences over c and h and get the same utility when declaring σ = z1. Thus, by DIC, agent
z must receive at least the same utility as agent z1. If y(z) = 0, UIC implies the reverse inequality, so
that the utility between z and z1 must be the same. Since agent z1’s problem is strictly concave, the
allocation designed for z1 minimizes the budget cost. Hence, we should use for all z with y(z) = 0
the allocation designed for z1.
Claim 2 Let λ be the multiplier associated to the budget constraint (1). We have λ = ∑Ni=1 pi(zi)φ(zi) =
E [φ].
Proof. This result is shown by a simple variational exercise. Since we can increase c(zi) by the
same amount for all i without violating the incentive constraints, it must be that ∑Ni=1 pi(zi)φ(zi) ≤
λ. Since we can also decrease all c(zi) uniformly in an incentive compatible way, it must be that
∑Ni=1 pi(zi)φ(zi) ≥ λ. Combining the two we get the desired equality.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, any solution to the second best problem where only downward incentive
constraints are imposed - that is, when the set of conditions (2) is relaxed to be σ ≤ z - delivers an optimal
allocation. In addition, the ‘local’ downward incentive constraints can be imposed as equalities. Finally, if
the upward incentive constraint is binding for two types zj < zk, then it is optimal for all agents with type
zi : zj ≤ zi ≤ zk to receive the same allocation (i.e, bunching).
Proof. We want to show that the solution from the relaxed second best problem, where the gov-
ernment maximizes the objective (3) subject to the budget constraint (1) and only the DIC in (2),
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is the solution to the original problem. In particular, we delete the UIC when the allocation is of
employment whereas the unemployed allocation is one of pooling from Claim 1. The problem is a
relaxed one, although the set of constraints that we neglect is endogenous to the chosen allocation.
The relaxed second best problem is:
max
c(·),y(·),h(·)
N
∑
i=1
pi (zi) φ(zi)
[
c (zi)− v
(
y (zi)
zi
+ h (zi)
)]
(R)
s.t.
N
∑
i=1
pi (zi) c (zi) +ω ≤∑
i
pi (zi) [y (zi) +ωh(zi)] + M,
and for all i with y(zi) > 0:
c (zi)− v
(
y (zi)
zi
+ h (zi)
)
≥ c (zj)− v
(
y
(
zj
)
zi
+ h
(
zj
)) ∀j < i; DIC(i)
Finally: y(z1) = 0, and ∀i such that y(zi) = 0, we impose c(zi)− v(h(zi)) = c(z1)− v(h(z1)).
Step 1: We start with a lemma that shows that the double crossing condition described by
Matthews and Moore (1987) holds for our framework.
Lemma 2 Assume that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let z− < z0 < z+ be three ordered values of productiv-
ity. Let w¯ := (c¯, y¯, h¯) and wˆ := (cˆ, yˆ, hˆ) be two allocations, and for all z > 0 define:
u(w; z) := c− v
(y
z
+ h
)
.
Suppose that we have
u(w¯; z−) ≥ u(wˆ; z−),
u(w¯; z+) ≥ u(wˆ; z+),
but
u(wˆ; z0) ≥ u(w¯; z0),
with at least one inequality holding as strict. Then (a) h¯ > hˆ, 0 < y¯ < yˆ, and y¯z∗ + h¯ >
yˆ
z∗ + hˆ, where
z∗ ∈ (z−, z+) is the value for which the function f (·) := u(wˆ; ·) − u(w¯; ·) takes the max with respect
to z; (b) if u(w¯; z+) > u(wˆ; z+), then we have u(w¯; z++) > u(wˆ; z++) for all z++ > z+; and (c) if
u(w¯; z−) > u(wˆ; z−), then we have u(w¯; z−−) > u(wˆ; z−−) for all z−− < z−.
Proof. A graphical representation of the result is reported in Figure A1 for ease of exposition. Let
z∗ ∈ (z−, z+) be the value for which the function f (z) := u(wˆ; z) − u(w¯; z) takes the max. The
necessary first order condition (FOC) and second order condition (SOC) are respectively:
f ′(z) =
yˆ
z2∗
v′
(
yˆ
z∗
+ hˆ
)
− y¯
z2∗
v′
(
y¯
z∗
+ h¯
)
= 0,
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Double Crossing Property
 zwu ,
 zwu ,
z0zz *z zz z
u
Figure A1: The above figure illustrates the double crossing property of indifference curves.
f ′′(z) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ yˆ
2
z4∗
v′′
(
yˆ
z∗
+ hˆ
)
− y¯
2
z4∗
v′′
(
y¯
z∗
+ h¯
)
=
yˆ
z4∗
v′′
(
yˆ
z∗ + hˆ
)
v′
(
yˆ
z∗ + hˆ
) − y¯
z4∗
v′′
(
y¯
z∗ + h¯
)
v′
(
y¯
z∗ + h¯
) ≥ 0,
where we used the FOC to simplify and rearrange the expression for the SOC. From the FOC, if
either y¯ = 0 or yˆ = 0, then it must be that both y¯ and yˆ are equal to 0. But then, from Claim 1, this
would imply that hˆ = h¯, so that the assumptions of the lemma would not be satisfied. So we can
safely presume that both y¯ and yˆ are positive so that the expression for the SOC is well defined.
(a) Suppose that h¯ < hˆ and recall that v is strictly convex. Then from the FOC, it must be that
y¯ > yˆ. Since by Assumption 1, the ratio v
′′
v′ decreases in the argument, the SOC can be satisfied
only if y¯z∗ + h¯ >
yˆ
z∗ + hˆ. But then, the FOC would not be satisfied. So it must be that h¯ ≥ hˆ and
as a consequence of the FOC, y¯ ≤ yˆ and y¯z∗ + h¯ ≥
yˆ
z∗ + hˆ. We can exclude the equality since we
assumed that at least one inequality is strict, while if h¯ = hˆ we must have y¯ = yˆ and all types will
be indifferent between the two allocations. We hence obtain the inequalities as stated in (a).
(b) Assume that u(w¯; z+) > u(wˆ; z+) and that for a z++ > z+ > z∗ we have instead u(w¯; z++) ≤
u(wˆ; z++). Then, there must be a minimum of f in the interval (z∗, z++]. It is easy to see, by reverting
the SOC inequality in the previous set of necessary conditions, that FOC and SOC would imply that
hˆ ≥ h¯ and yˆ ≤ y¯, thereby contradicting the result in (a). Result (c) is shown symmetrically.
Step 2: We can now start the core proof of Lemma 1. We use an induction argument. Denote the
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set of upward incentive constraints associated with mimicking agent i:
c
(
zj
)− v(y (zj)
zj
+ h
(
zj
)) ≥ c (zi)− v(y (zi)zj + h (zi)
)
∀j < i. UIC(i)
First, note that UIC(1) is empty. Note also that since z1=0, if y(z2) > 0, then the UIC associated
with z1 mimicking z2 would be satisfied as type z1 = 0 agent would have an infinite cost of effort
(since v is convex, we can bound the derivative downwards: lime→∞ v(e) = ∞). If y(z2) = 0, then
Claim 1 implies that z2 must receive the same allocation as that of agent z1 so that both DIC and UIC
between z1 and z2 are satisfied. In addition, if y(z2) > 0, then the DIC between z2 and z1 must also be
binding. Otherwise, it would be possible to find a small enough e > 0 such that decreasing c(zi) for
all i > 1 by e and increasing c(z1) by
∑Ni=2 pi(zi)
pi(z1)
e, would leave the budget constraint unchanged. This
consumption perturbation, however, would be incentive compatible as long as the DIC between
z2 and z1 is slack and e is small enough. Note indeed that each agent zi > z2 receives the same
utility by mimicking z1. Recall that we impose DIC for all agents. A slack DIC between z2 and z1
implies that for all zi > z2 the DIC of agent i mimicking agent z1 would also be slack. Finally,
since consumption for all zi > z1 change by the same amount, incentive constraints are not affected
among agents i > 1. This perturbation would weakly increases welfare since φ(z1) ≥ E[φ], by
Assumption 3, hence generating a contradiction to optimality. In summary, we have shown that for
i = 1, 2 the LDIC is binding and all UIC(i) constraints are satisfied for all i ≤ 2. This is our starting
point for the induction argument.
Now let 1 < k < N and assume that all UIC(i) constraints are satisfied for all i ≤ k. We will show
that in the relaxed problem (R) the LDIC must be satisfied with equality. In particular, we will show
that, if the local LDIC is slack and the induction hypothesis is true, then none of the non-local downward
constraints can be binding. Suppose that we have zj < zk < zk+1 such that the LDIC between zk and
zk+1 is slack while the DIC between zj and zk+1 is binding. Since we have
c (zk+1)− v
(
y (zk+1)
zk+1
+ h (zk+1)
)
> c (zk)− v
(
y (zk)
zk+1
+ h (zk)
)
,
it must be that:
c (zk+1)− v
(
y (zk+1)
zk+1
+ h (zk+1)
)
= c
(
zj
)− v(y (zj)
zk+1
+ h
(
zj
))
> c (zk)− v
(
y (zk)
zk+1
+ h (zk)
)
.
(A2)
On the other hand, from the DIC we have:
c (zk)− v
(
y (zk)
zk
+ h (zk)
)
≥ c (zj)− v
(
y
(
zj
)
zk
+ h
(
zj
))
,
while from the UIC (which, by the inductive hypothesis, are assumed to be satisfied for j ≤ k) we
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have:
c
(
zj
)− v(y (zj)
zj
+ h
(
zj
)) ≥ c (zk)− v(y (zk)zj + h (zk)
)
.
We thus have the conditions to apply Lemma 2, where the three ranked types are zj < zk < zk+1 and
the supposedly optimal bundle for type zk takes the role of bundle (cˆ, yˆ, hˆ) while the bundle for type
zj plays the role of the (c¯, y¯, h¯) bundle in the Lemma. Lemma 2(b) implies that for all z++ > zk+1,
c
(
zj
)− v(y (zj)
z++
+ h
(
zj
))
> c (zk)− v
(
y (zk)
z++
+ h (zk)
)
.
But then from DIC, we have that all z++ > zk+1 prefer their own bundle to that of agent zj. Hence,
we have:
c (z++)− v
(
y (z++)
z++
+ h (z++)
)
≥ c (zj)− v
(
y
(
zj
)
z++
+ h
(
zj
))
> c (zk)− v
(
y (zk)
z++
+ h (zk)
)
,
which is impossible if yk > yj as indicated in point (a) of the Lemma. So, no DIC is binding in terms
of mimicking zk. The first order conditions in the relaxed problem will therefore be those of full
information. In particular,
zk = v′
(
y (zk)
zk
+ h (zk)
)
.
At the same time, since zk+1 has a binding constraint with zj, we have:
zj ≥ v′
(
y
(
zj
)
zj
+ h
(
zj
))
.
Since zk > zj, these conditions imply that:
v′
(
y (zk)
zk
+ h (zk)
)
> v′
(
y
(
zj
)
zj
+ h
(
zj
))
. (A3)
Now, consider the DIC between zk and zj:
c(zk)− v
(
y(zk)
zk
+ h(zk)
)
≥ c(zj)− v
(
y(zj)
zk
+ h(zj)
)
.
Since v is convex and zk > zj, we also have v′
(
y(zk)
zk
+ h (zk)
)
> v′
(
y(zj)
zk
+ h
(
zj
))
from inequality
(A3), which together with the DIC implies that c(zk) > c(zj).
From (A2), since c
(
zj
) − v( y(zj)zk+1 + h (zj)
)
> c (zk) − v
(
y(zk)
zk+1
+ h (zk)
)
, it must therefore be
that:
v
(
y(zk)
zk+1
+ h(zk)
)
> v
(
y(zj)
zk+1
+ h(zj)
)
⇐⇒ y(zk)
zk+1
+ h(zk) >
y(zj)
zk+1
+ h(zj). (A4)
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Since Lemma 2(a) implies that y(zk) > y(zj) and h(zk) < h(zj), inequality (A4) implies that
y(zk)
z + h(zk) >
y(zj)
z + h(zj) for all z ≤ zk+1. On the other hand, Lemma 2(a) also implies that
y(zk)
z∗ + h(zk) <
y(zj)
z∗ + h(zj) for some zj < z∗ < zk+1. This is hence a contradiction. It must therefore
be that if LDIC for zk+1 is slack, then all DIC for zk+1 must also be slack.
But then, if the DIC for agent zk+1 mimicking a lower type are slack, we can find an incentive
compatible e > 0, such that we can increase c(zi) for all i 6= k + 1 by e and decrease c(zk+1) by
∑i 6=k+1 pi(zi)
pi(zk+1)
e, such that the budget constraint remains the same. This will be incentive compatible
since the LDIC between zk+1 and zk is slack by assumption and consumption for all i 6= k + 1
increase by the same amount. Welfare changes by the amount[
∑
i 6=k+1
pi(zi)φ(zi)− ∑
i 6=k+1
pi(zi)φ(zk+1)
]
e ≥ 0,
where the inequality is implied by Assumption 3. Thus, it must be that the LDIC are binding.
We now show that binding LDIC implies that the UIC are satisfied. Note that the binding LDIC for
zk+1 mimicking zk implies:
y(zk+1) +ωh(zk+1)− c(zk+1) ≥ y(zk) +ωh(zk)− c(zk).
This must be true, otherwise, the budget constraint could be relaxed (strictly) by replacing allo-
cation (y(zk+1), h(zk+1), c(zk+1)) with allocation (y(zk), h(zk), c(zk)). Namely, we can give to agent
zk+1 the contract designed for agent zk. By eliminating one contract, all incentive constraints will
remain satisfied and agent zk+1’s utility will be the same as the agent is indifferent between the two
allocations. By the induction assumption, since all LDIC are satisfied with equality, we have that
y(zi) +ωh(zi)− c(zi) weakly increases with zi for i = 1, . . . , k + 1.
Now, assume that some of the UIC(k+1) are not satisfied. Namely, for some 1 < j ≤ k (recall
that the UIC(1) is empty), we have:
c (zk+1)− v
(
y (zk+1)
zj
+ h (zk+1)
)
> c
(
zj
)− v(y (zj)
zj
+ h
(
zj
))
.
Then, it must be that for such zj we have:
y(zk+1) +ωh(zk+1)− c(zk+1) < y(zj) +ωh(zj)− c(zj).
Otherwise, we could replace allocation (y(zj), h(zj), c(zj)) with (y(zk+1), h(zk+1), c(zk+1)). The bud-
get constraint would be weakly relaxed, the incentive constraints remain satisfied, and agent zj
would have higher utility. Hence welfare would increase (strictly). But this provides a contradic-
tion to the monotonicity obtained from the binding LDIC. Hence, it must be that all UIC(k+1) are
satisfied.
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Finally, we show that bunching may occur and characterize when this happens. Claim 1 shows that
if y(zi) = y(zj) = 0, then UIC are trivially satisfied and bunching arises. So, assume that zi > zj
and y(zi) > 0. If the UIC between zj vs zi is binding, it must be that y(zi) + ωh(zi) − c(zi) ≤
y(zj) +ωh(zj)− c(zj). Otherwise, we can eliminate the allocation for agent zj and give agent zj the
allocation now in place for agent zi. This would keep welfare the same as UIC is binding and also
relax the budget constraint. But since the DIC are binding for all k ≤ i and i > j, the argument
we made above implies that the reverse inequality must also be true. Thus, it much be that y(zi) +
ωh(zi)− c(zi) ≤ y(zj) +ωh(zj)− c(zj). Let’s now look at type zi−1. The previous argument implies
that y(zi) + ωh(zi) − c(zi) = y(zi−1) + ωh(zi−1) − c(zi−1) = y(zj) + ωh(zj) − c(zj). Recall that
the binding LDIC between zi and zi−1 implies that agent zi is indifferent between the allocation
designed for him and the allocation designed for zi−1. So, we can eliminate the allocation designed
for him and use the allocation designed for zi−1 instead. As usual, this will keep the budget and
welfare the same, and possibly relax the incentive constraints. This same argument can be done till
agent zj. Hence a bunching allocation among these agents would be optimal when UIC is binding.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, we have:
(a) The ‘net surplus’ y∗(z) +ωh∗(z)− c∗(z) is non-decreasing in z;
(b) Utility of agents in equilibrium V∗(z|z) is non-decreasing in z, and strictly increasing between any
two levels zi+1 > zi when y∗(zi) > 0.
(c) For all z, h∗(z) ≤ 1.
Proof. We omit the superscript * on the optimal allocation for notational simplicity.
(a) The monotonicity property of the net surplus has been shown in the proof of Lemma 1, using
the fact that LDIC are satisfied with equality.
(b) We know from Claim 1 that if y(zi) = y(zi−1) = 0, then we have pooling so that zi and zi−1 will
get the same utility. Now, suppose that y(zi) > y(zi−1) = 0. Recall that z1 = 0 and y(z1) = 0. Since
LDIC implies
c (z1)− v (h (z1)) ≤ c (zi)− v
(
y (zi)
zi
+ h (zi)
)
,
utility must be weakly increasing. Now, assume that the lower type has y(zi−1) > 0. Then DIC
implies that
c (zi)− v
(
y (zi)
zi
+ h (zi)
)
≥ c (zi−1)− v
(
y (zi−1)
zi
+ h (zi−1)
)
> c (zi−1)− v
(
y (zi−1)
zi−1
+ h (zi−1)
)
,
where the first inequality uses the incentive compatibility constraint while the second inequality
uses the fact that zi > zi−1 and y(zi−1) > 0.
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(c) Suppose that we have h(zi) > 1 for some i. Since the marginal return to providing house-
hold child care beyond child care needs is zero while the marginal cost is positive, we can reduce
both h(zi) and c(zi) so that the utility of agent zi is unchanged (if we denote cˆ and hˆ as the new
values, we have: c(zi) − cˆ = v
(
y(zi)
zi
+ h(zi)
)
− v
(
y(zi)
zi
+ hˆ
)
), and relax the budget constraint
(which can subsequently be translated to an increase in welfare by a uniform increase in con-
sumption). The incentives of agent zi to mimic lower type agents are unchanged since utility of
agent zi is unchanged. We also need to show that such a change weakly relaxes the DIC of higher
types. When y(zi) = 0, incentives are unchanged since higher type agents get the same utility as
agent zi when mimicking type zi. When y(zi) > 0, the convexity of v implies that higher types
will now get a lower utility when pretending to be type zi. This is so since for z > zi, we have
v
(
y(zi)
z + h(zi)
)
− v
(
y(zi)
z + hˆ
)
< v
(
y(zi)
zi
+ h(zi)
)
− v
(
y(zi)
zi
+ hˆ
)
by the convexity of v.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, we have:
(a) Unemployment: Recall that z1 = 0. We have y∗(z1) = 0 and h∗ (z1) > 0, where
1− 1
ω
v′ (h∗(z1)) ≥ 0, (A5)
with equality whenever v′(1) ≥ ω. If v′(1) ≤ ω, then h∗(z1) = 1. In addition, for all z such that
y∗ (z) = 0, type z gets the same allocation as type z1.
(b) Low productivity: Let z ≤ ω. We have h∗ (z) > 0, and if y∗(z) > 0, then h∗(z) = 1.
(c) Segmentation: If y∗(z) > 0, then y∗ (z′) > 0 for all z′ > z.
(d) Monotonicity: Let z′ > z for which we have no bunching. If h∗(z′) ≤ h∗(z), then y∗(z′) > y∗(z);
and if y∗(z′) ≤ y∗(z), then h∗(z′) > h∗(z).
(e) Wedges for the employed: Let zi be such that y∗ (zi) > 0. Then labor wedges are non-negative:
1− 1
zi
v′ (e∗(zi)) ≥ 0; (A6)
If, in addition, h∗ (zi) > 0, then the child care wedges are also non-negative:
1− 1
ω
v′ (e∗(zi)) ≥ 0. (A7)
Both wedges are strictly positive whenever φ(zi+1) < E [φ].
For i = N, the labor wedge is zero and h∗(zN) = 0.
Proof. We omit the superscript * on the optimal allocation for notational simplicity.
(a) This result has been shown in Claim 1.
(b) If y(z) = 0, then agent z gets the unemployed allocation and provides h(z) = h(0) > 0, as shown
in Claim 1. Now, suppose that for z ≤ ω, y(z) > 0 but h(z) < 1. We show that we can reduce y
and increase h so as to keep agent z’s utility constant without violating any DIC nor the budget
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constraint. The budget constraint can only improve since keeping agent’s z ≤ ω utility constant
implies a change ∆y + z∆h = 0 ≤ ∆y + ω∆h, where the last quantity is the change in the budget
constraint. The DIC are not affected since all z′ > z will now find the new allocation less attractive
than before (note that ∆h(z) = ∆y(z)z ≥ ∆y(z)z′ so that type z′ mimicking z will now face higher effort
cost). This change would strictly improve welfare since we can uniformly redistribute the increase
in the budget, ∆y +ω∆h, among all types without altering incentives.
(c) We want to show that if for zi we have y(zi) > 0, then it must be that y(zn) > 0 for all n > i (we
know that y(z1) = 0, so i > 1). Suppose that for k > i > j we have both y
(
zj
)
= y (zk) = 0 and
y (zi) > 0. From Lemma 1(ii), we know that utility between i + 1 and i must be strictly increasing
since y(zi) > 0. We also know that utility is weakly increasing in type from the DIC. So, the utility
of agent zk ≥ zi+1 must be strictly larger than the utility of agent zj ≤ zi. But we know that we have
pooling among the unemployed, and they all receive the same utility, so that zk and zj must have
the same utility if y(zj) = y(zk) = 0. Hence, we get a contradiction.
(d) Since the case where y(zi−1) = 0 is trivial to show, we show it for the case where y(zi−1) > 0
(hence i > 1). From (c) above, we have y(zi) > 0 as well. Using the DIC and UIC between zi and
zi−1 (recall that the local DIC binds):
c (zi)− v
(
y(zi)
zi
+ h (zi)
)
= c (zi−1)− v
(
y(zi−1)
zi
+ h (zi−1)
)
c (zi−1)− v
(
y(zi−1)
zi−1 + h (zi−1)
)
≥ c (zi)− v
(
y(zi)
zi−1 + h (zi)
)
.
Adding the two inequalities together and rearranging, we get:
v
(
y (zi)
zi−1
+ h (zi)
)
− v
(
y (zi)
zi
+ h (zi)
)
≥ v
(
y (zi−1)
zi−1
+ h (zi−1)
)
− v
(
y (zi−1)
zi
+ h (zi−1)
)
.
By the first fundamental theorem of calculus, this implies that:
ˆ zi
zi−1
v′
(
y (zi)
s
+ h (zi)
)
y (zi)
s2
ds ≤
ˆ zi
zi−1
v′
(
y (zi−1)
s
+ h (zi−1)
)
y (zi−1)
s2
ds.
If h (zi) > h (zi−1), then convexity of v (.) and y (zi) ≥ y (zi−1) > 0 would imply that the integrand
on the left hand side is everywhere larger than the right hand side, a contradiction. Thus, it must
be that y (zi) < y (zi−1). The equivalent result says that if y (zi) ≥ y (zi−1) then h (zi) ≤ h (zi−1).
Since the index i was generic, we have shown monotonicity. Clearly, if there is no bunching we can
show the stronger result: If h (zi) ≥ h (zi−1), then y (zi) < y (zi−1) and the equivalent statement: If
y (zi) ≥ y (zi−1), then h (zi) < h (zi−1) .
(e) Recall the relaxed problem (R). From Lemma 1, we can charaterize the problem by focusing
on problem (R). For zi such that y(zi) > 0, the first order conditions with respect to consumption,
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earnings and household child care, are given by:
c (zi) : [pi (zi) φ(zi) + δ (zi)] v′
(
y(zi)
zi
+ h(zi)
)
= [∑k>i µi(zk) + λpi (zi)] v′
(
y(zi)
zi
+ h(zi)
)
,
y (zi) : [pi (zi) φ(zi) + δ(zi)] v′
(
y(zi)
zi
+ h(zi)
)
= ∑k>i µi(zk)
zi
zk
v′
(
y(zi)
zk
+ h(zi)
)
+ λpi (zi) zi,
h (zi) : [pi (zi) φ(zi) + δ(zi)] v′
(
y(zi)
zi
+ h(zi)
)
≥ ∑k>i µi(zk)v′
(
y(zi)
zk
+ h(zi)
)
+ λpi (zi)ω,
where µj(zi) ≥ 0 is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the DIC guaranteeing that agent
zi does not mimic type zj < zi. For all i, we defined δ (zi) := ∑j<i µj(zi) and multiplied the first
condition by v′
(
y(zi)
zi
+ h(zi)
)
and the second one by zi > 0. Clearly, the first order conditions for y
and h are satisfied with equality when we have an interior solution for them.
Substituting the first order condition with respect to c(zi) into those with respect to y(zi) and
h(zi), and rearranging, we get:
λpi(zi)zi = λpi(zi)v′
(
y(zi)
zi
+ h(zi)
)
+∑
k>i
µi(zk)
[
v′
(
y(zi)
zi
+ h(zi)
)
− zi
zk
v′
(
y(zi)
zk
+ h(zi)
)]
,
and
λpi(zi)w ≤ λpi(zi)v′
(
y(zi)
zi
+ h(zi)
)
+∑
k>i
µi(zk)
[
v′
(
y(zi)
zi
+ h(zi)
)
− v′
(
y(zi)
zk
+ h(zi)
)]
,
with equality if h(zi) > 0. The term in square brackets are strictly positive since zk > zi and v is
convex. It is now easy to see how we can get the wedges.
We now want to show that when φ(zi+1) < λ = E [φ] (where the last equality is from Claim 2), then
some DIC must be binding with µi(zk) > 0 for some k > i.
Suppose that all µi(zk) are nil. Then, from the first order conditions with respect to y(zi) and
h(zi), we have λpi (zi) zi ≥ λpi (zi)ω, which implies zi ≥ ω. Excluding the knife edge case of
zi = ω,30 the first order conditions imply h(zi) = 0 and:
zi = v′
(
y (zi)
zi
)
.
In addition, for all zj < zi for which y(zj) > 0, we have:
zj ≥ v′
(
y
(
zj
)
zj
+ h(zj)
)
;
and if y(zj) = 0, we have h(zj) > 0 and:
ω ≥ v′ (h(zj)) .
30If zi = ω, point (b) above implies that in this case, y(zi) > 0 implies h(zi) = 1. It would also imply either
y(zj) = 0 or h(zj) = 1 for all zj < zi. Hence y(zi) > y(zj) and the proof would follow the same line as we do
here assuming that zi > ω.
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Since both zi > zj and zi ≥ ω, the two inequalities imply:
v′
(
y (zi)
zi
)
> v′
(
y
(
zj
)
zj
+ h(zj)
)
or v′
(
y (zi)
zi
)
≥ v′ (h(zj)) .
Convexity of v and h(zj) ≥ 0 imply y(zj) < y(zi) as a consequence of the first inequality, and
y(zj) = 0 < y(zi) as a consequence of the second. Allowing for zeros, we can summarize the above
conditions by:
y (zi)
zi
>
y
(
zj
)
zj
+ h(zj) and y(zj) < y(zi), h(zj) ≥ h(zi) = 0.
In addition, since zi+1 > zi > zj we have
y(zi)
zi
>
y(zj)
zi+1
+ h(zj). From Proposition 1(ii) since utility is
increasing, we have:
ci − v
(
y(zi)
zi
)
> cj − v
(
y(zj)
zj
+ h(zj)
)
.
This, together with y(zi)zi >
y(zj)
zi+1
+ h(zj) implies c(zi) > c(zj).
Now, if we look at the first order condition for c(zi+1), since by assumption, φ(zi+1) < λ, we
must have δ(zi+1) > 0. As a consequence, by the definition of δ(zi+1), some DIC is binding for
agent i + 1, with positive multiplier: µj(zi+1) > 0 for some j < i (by assumption, µi(zi+1) = 0).
Consider such a j. Since the LDIC for zi+1 is binding (and by assumption for such j the non-local
DIC zi+1 vs zj binds), we have:
ci+1 − v
(
y(zi+1)
zi+1
)
= ci − v
(
y(zi)
zi+1
)
,
= cj − v
(
y(zj)
zi+1
+ h(zj)
)
.
Since we saw above that c(zi) > c(zj), it must be that:
v
(
y(zi)
zi+1
)
> v
(
y(zj)
zi+1
+ h(zj)
)
⇐⇒ y(zi)
zi+1
>
y(zj)
zi+1
+ h(zj). (A8)
Now, define:
∆(z) := c(zi)− v
(
y(zi)
z
)
−
[
c(zj)− v
(
y(zj)
z
+ h(zj)
)]
.
Using again the fact that both the LDIC for zi+1 and the non-local DIC zi+1 vs zj bind, we have that
∆(zi+1) = 0. Moreover, DIC (recall j < i) implies ∆(zi) ≥ 0. At the same time, deriving with respect
to z, we have:
∆′(z) =
y(zi)
z2
v′
(
y(zi)
z
)
− y(zj)
z2
v′
(
y(zj)
z
+ h(zj)
)
.
Since y(zi) > y(zj), if we show that for all z ∈ [zi, zi+1] we have v′
(
y(zi)
z
)
> v′
(
y(zj)
z + h(zj)
)
, then
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we would be done. This is so since the above inequality implies that ∆′(z) > 0 for z ∈ [zi, zi+1],
contradicting the fact that ∆(zi) ≥ ∆(zi+1) = 0. This would hence mean that the initial assumption
was false, namely we must have some µk(zi) > 0. Recall that from (A8) we have
y(zi)
zi+1
>
y(zj)
zi+1
+ h(zj).
Since y(zi) > y(zj), then
y(zi)
z >
y(zj)
z + h(zj) ∀z ≤ zi+1 as desired.
We have hence shown that for zi with y(zi) > 0 and φ(zi+1) < λ = E [φ] (thus, zi < zN):
zi > v′ (e (zi)) .
Now, suppose that for zi we have both y(zi) > 0 and h (z) > 0. If zi > ω, then the first order
conditions exclude the possibility that all multipliers µi(zk) are zero. On the other hand, we saw
above that if all multipliers µi(zk) are zero and y(zi) > 0, then it must be that zi ≥ ω. If we exclude
the case zi = ω, we hence have that:31
ω > v′ (e (zi)) .
The standard no distortion at the top result is easily obtained from the first order conditions as no
DIC exists for this agent. Since zN > ω, we must have h(zN) = 0 and:
1− 1
zN
v′
(
y (zN)
zN
)
= 0⇒ 1− 1
ω
v′
(
y (zN)
zN
)
< 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Let f ∗(σ) be the optimal formal child care cost associated with the constrained optimal h∗(σ). The following
subsidy rates and transfers implement the constrained optimum.
(a) For employed agents, we have:
If σ /∈ Z∗0 , then s (σ, f ) =

(
1− 1ωv′
(
y∗(σ)
zN
+ h∗(σ)
))+
i f f ≤ f ∗ (σ) ;(
1− 1ωv′
(
y∗(σ)
z¯0
+ h∗(σ)
))−
i f f > f ∗ (σ) .
(b) For unemployed agents, the subsidy rate is zero: If σ ∈ Z∗0 , then s (σ, f ) = 0 ∀ f .
(c) For all σ ∈ Z, the optimal transfer scheme is set as follows:
T (σ) = y∗(σ)− c∗ (σ)− f ∗ (σ) + s (σ, f ∗ (σ)) f ∗ (σ) ;
where c∗ (·) and y∗ (·) are the consumption and income functions of the second best allocation.
31The case were all multipliers are zero and zi = ω also has h(zi) = 1 from point (b) above. If v′(1) > ω,
then it cannot be. This case hence can only happen when v′(1) ≤ ω. For this case, we can follow the same line
of proof as before to derive the wedge for y(zi) to obtain a contradiction (recall that if zj < zi, then zj < ω).
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Proof. Consider the following maximisation problem for all z, σ ∈ Z2:
Vˆ(σ|z) := max
f
y∗(σ)− T (σ)− (1− s (σ, f )) f − v
(
y∗(σ)
z
− ω− f
ω
)
.
From the arguments we made in the main text, the piecewise linear function s(σ, f ) implies that
the solution to the above maximization problem is f ∗(σ) for each z /∈ Z0 and for z = z¯0. From the
expression of T, when f = f ∗(σ), we have:
y∗(σ)− T (σ)− (1− s (σ, f ∗(σ))) f ∗(σ) = c∗ (σ) .
Since declaring σ forces the agent to choose y∗(σ), for all such z we have Vˆ(σ|z) = V∗(σ|z), the
second best value for each declaration σ. That is, each type z, such that either z /∈ Z0 or z = z¯0
declaring σ and possibly deviating in f , gets at most V∗(σ|z). Since the second best allocation is
incentive compatible, we have shown that the proposed scheme is robust to joint deviations in σ and
f for all such types. Consider now unemployed agents: z ∈ Z0 and z < z¯0. Since all unemployed
receive the same utility in equilibrium, we have for all these agents V∗(z|z) = V∗(z¯0|z¯0). On the
other hand, it is immediate to see that for all z < z¯0, Vˆ(σ|z) ≤ Vˆ(σ|z¯0). The fact that agent z¯0 does
not want to deviate hence implies that none of these agents want to deviate either. In summary, we
have shown that each type z ∈ Z chooses to tell the truth, produces y∗(z) and spends f ∗(z) in formal
child care. Since transfers T(·) are adjusted by the child care subsidy to satisfy the government
budget constraint, the proof is complete.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Under Assumption 4, there is a T ∈ R such that the following subsidy rates and transfers implement the
constrained optimum.
(a) For employed agents (who earn y > 0), we have:
s (y, f ) =

(
1− 1ωv′
(
y
zN
+ 1− f (y)ω
))+
i f f ≤ f (y) ;(
1− 1ωv′
(
y
z¯0
+ 1− f (y)ω
))−
i f f > f (y) ;
if y ∈ Y then T (y) = y− c (y)− f (y) + s (y, f (y)) f (y) ; otherwise T (y) = T.
(b) For unemployed agents (with y = 0), the second best allocation is implemented by having:
s(0, f ) ≡ 0, and T(0) = −c (0)− f (0) .
Proof. Let y be such that v′
(
y
zN
)
= zN and T := y +max(σ,z)∈Z2 V∗(σ|z). Agent z solves:
max
y≥0, f≤ω
y− T(y)− (1− s(y, f )) f+ − v
(
y
z
− ω− f
ω
)
.
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Under Assumption 4, for each y ∈ R+, there is only one value for f (y) and hence, a well defined
subsidy rate schedule s(y, f ). Since for each σ there is only one value of y ∈ Y , to each σ in the
direct mechanism there is only one pair of values y and f . Moreover, it is immediate to see that the
punishment induced by T implies that no agent will ever choose y /∈ Y . For y ∈ Y , however, the
agent has weakly less joint deviations available compared to those considered in the implementa-
tion of Proposition 3. Moreover, for y ∈ Y , the welfare and net revenues for the government are as
in the direct mechanism. The result hence follows from Proposition 3.
B Numerical Appendix
B.1 Agent’s Private Problem
Before describing the selection and calibration procedures, we first try to understand mothers’ pri-
vate decisions given the existing US tax and benefit system (E). We can rewrite the agent’s private
problem (9) as:
U(z; T,ω) = max
l,h≥0
zl − TE (y, f )−ω (1− h)+ − 1
θ
(l + h)1+γ
1+ γ
,
where earnings y = zl and formal child care cost f = ω (1− h). Let l(z; T,ω) be the labor supply
choice for agent z under the transfer program T and child care cost ω. In our framework, the
reservation wage R(T,ω) can be identified with the hypothetical type for which l(z; T,ω) > 0 if
z > R(T,ω) and l(z; T,ω) = 0 if z < R(T,ω). Obviously, we do not observe the distribution of
types for wages below R(T,ω). In order to identify the distribution of z for z < R(T,ω), in the
next section, we assume that (the types of) mother with kids above six years of age are distributed as
our group of reference. When kids are grown up, mothers plausibly face a lower amount of child
care needs. To ease the exposition, suppose that mothers with grown up kids face no child care
needs at all. This would correspond to a ω′ = 0. It is immediate to see that, since in the US tax
scheme TEy (0, 0) < 1 (i.e, income tax is less than 100% at zero income) and when there are no child
care needs f (z; T, 0) = 0 for all z, the reservation wage for these agents is zero, i.e., R(T, 0) = 0. In
general, we will assume that a reduction in child care needs reduces the reservation wage.
B.2 Wage Imputation
Wages for working mothers are computed as yearly gross earnings divided by total hours of work
in one year.32 On the other hand, non working mothers have no earnings. In our model, a mother
may not be working either because (i) she has no employment opportunities (z1 = 0) or (ii) her wage
is below her reservation wage. As described in the text, we consider the involuntarily unemployed
32We drop mothers with wages above $40 which consist of 39 observations (approximately 1% of the sam-
ple). Those mothers are very sparsely distributed between a wage range of $40 to $276.
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as those with no employment opportunities. We now focus our analysis on the remaining mothers,
that is, those who are either working or voluntarily unemployed.
Our log wage function is given by:
ln wagei = Xiβ+ ei,
where Xi is a vector of demographic characteristics such as age, education, health, ethnicity and
number of children, that are correlated with wages, and ei is an unobserved component. β is a
vector of coefficients that we aim to estimate so that we can impute wages for the unemployed.
Note, however, that wages are observed only for the employed. If there is a correlation between
wages and the decision to work, the distribution of ei will be truncated. We therefore would not be
able to rely on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions to estimate β and would need to account
for the selection of agents into work.
From the agent’s private problem in Section B.1, she works if z > R(T,ω), where R is the
reservation wage. As we just saw, mothers with child care needs have a positive reservation wage.
We therefore model the work decision of the agent as:
worki = 1 [δlnwagei − γKi − ηi > 0] ,
where Ki is a dummy variable that captures the child care needs of agents (presence of children
aged below 6) and therefore Ki = 1 reflects a positive reservation wage (R > 0) of mothers. The
random variable ηi is an unobserved determinant of work participation that may be present in the
real world, and δ and γ are coefficients to be estimated.
Using the equation for log wage, we can rewrite the work decision as:
worki = 1 [Xiψ− γKi − ui > 0] ,
where ui = δei − ηi. The unobserved terms are assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution:[
ei
ui
]
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
[
σε ρ
ρ 1
])
,
where σε is the variance of ei and ρ is the correlation between ei and ui.
Thus, the conditional mean of log wages is given by:
E [ln wagei|worki = 1] = Xiβ+ ρσeλi (Xiψ− γKi) ,
where λi (Xiψ− γKi) = φ(Xiψ−γKi)Φ(Xiψ−γKi) and φ and Φ are the normal pdf and cdf respectively. λi is the
inverse mills ratio that takes into account the fact that the distribution of ei is truncated. Note that
even in the absence of the unobserved determinant of work, ηi, we would still have a selection issue.
This is because in this case, ui = δei, so that there would still be a correlation between wages and
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the work decision.
We use the whole sample of single mothers aged between 18 and 50 and with children under
18 from March 2010 CPS data for our estimation purposes. Table A1 reports summary statistics for
this group.
Table A1: Summary Statistics for Single Mothers with Children under 18
Variable Mean s.d. Variable Mean s.d.
Age 30.6 9.62 Black 0.21 0.41
High school graduate 0.29 0.49 Proportion working 0.62 0.49
College or university 0.51 0.50 Yearly hours of work (if > 0) 1,559 766
No. of children under 6 0.45 0.69 Wage per hour (if > 0) 13.63 8.31
No. of children under 18 1.67 1.92 Has a child under age 6 0.35 0.48
White 0.70 0.46 No. of observations 7,060
Source: March 2010 CPS data on single women with at least one child aged below 18. We limit the sample to
women who are not involuntarily unemployed but who are either working or voluntarily unemployed (out
of the labor force).
The imputation is done using the Heckman two step estimation procedure (Wooldridge, 2002).
First run a probit using work status as the dependent variable and construct the inverse mills ra-
tio. In the second stage, run an OLS regression using log of wages as the dependent variable and
controlling for demographics X and the inverse mills ratio.
In order to identify our selection correction term, we rely on the non-linearity of the inverse
Mills ratio and on the use of an exclusion restriction in the work equation. The exclusion restriction
needs to be a variable which may affect mother’s work decision but not her wages. We use a dummy
variable indicating whether a mother has a child under 6 for this purpose. While the total number
of children may be correlated with a women’s past work decisions and therefore work experience
and wages, once we control for the total number of children, we do not expect the presence of a
child under 6 to immediately affect her wages although it may affect her current work decision.
This corresponds to our variable Ki which captures child care needs of mothers.
Table A2 reports regression results for our selection and wage equations. As can be seen from
our selection equation in column (i), having a child aged below 6 has a negative and statistically
significant impact on the work decision of mothers. Moreover, from our wage equation in column
(ii), the coefficient of the mills ratio is positive and significant suggesting that individuals who work
tend on average to have higher wages.
As discussed in the text, we are interested in the potential wage distribution of voluntarily
unemployed mothers who would have been working if they did not have child care needs. We
therefore impute their potential log wage as:
E [ln wagei|Xiψ− γKi ≤ ui ≤ Xiψ] = Xiβ− ρσe
[
φ (Xiψ− γKi)− φ (Xiψ)
Φ (Xiψ− γKi)−Φ (Xiψ)
]
.
From there, we can infer the potential wage distribution of voluntarily unemployed mothers by
finding out the proportion of mothers with a given potential wage.
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Table A2: Selected Coefficients from Work and Wage Regressions
Dependent variable (i) work (ii) lnwage
coef s.e. coef s.e.
Age 0.194∗∗ (0.015) 0.148∗ (0.021)
High school graduate 1.111∗∗ (0.346) 0.697∗ (0.294)
Undergraduate degree 1.731∗∗ (0.352) 1.225∗∗ (0.314)
No. of children under 18 -0.038 (0.056) -0.022 (0.033)
Fair health 0.788
∗∗
(0.118) 0.249
†
(0.129)
Good health 1.300∗∗ (0.110) 0.464∗∗ (0.167)
Very good health 1.300∗∗ (0.110) 0.606∗∗ (0.182)
Excellent health 1.490∗∗ (0.111) 0.621∗∗ (0.182)
White 0.251∗∗ (0.065) 0.065 (0.044)
Black 0.173∗∗ (0.075) 0.047 (0.046)
Any child under 6 -0.073∗ (0.037)
Mills 0.529∗∗∗ (0.177)
No. of observations 7,060
Standard errors reported in brackets. Controls also include age squared, number of children squared, average
unemployment rate in state of residence and state dummies. †significant at 10%, ∗significant at 5% and
∗∗significant at 1%.
B.3 Calibration
2010 US Tax and Benefits System
Unemployment benefits Unemployment benefits are set at $5,500 such that, given the US tax
and benefit system, the proportion of working mothers predicted by our model fit the proportion
of working mothers (56%) in our CPS sample. Since families with two children receive on average
$412 TANF benefits per month (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2011), we interpret
unemployment benefits as the sum of yearly TANF benefits of $4,944 and of additional benefits of
$556 which may constitute of unemployment insurance benefits or food stamps that an unemployed
individual may be eligible for. We do not explicitly set unemployment insurance benefits as young
mothers may not be eligible for them if they have no previous work experience.
Federal taxes Taxable income is based on earnings minus standard deductions of $5,700 for a
single childless person and of $8,400 for the head of household. Each taxpayer and dependent also
get personal exemptions of $3,650. The tax rates are as follows (Taxes About):
Tax rate Taxable income
10% Less than $8,375
15% $8,375 - $34,000
25% $34,000 - $82,400
28% $82,400 - $171,850
33% $171,850 - $373,650
35% $373,650 and above
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Social Security taxes The Social Security base wage was $106,800 in 2010 and the employee rate
7.65% (Payroll Experts).
Earned Income Tax Credit The EITC is a refundable tax credit payable to working families.
Earned income must be below $40,363 for a single parent with two children aged below 18 and the
maximum credit was $5,036 in 2010 (Tax Policy Center, 2010a). The phase-in rate was 40% and the
phase-out rate 21.06% while the phase-out income range starts at $16,420. In the phase-in income
range, EITC benefits are computed as 40% of earned income up to the maximum credit of $5,036.
In the phase-out income range, EITC benefits are the difference between the maximum credit and
21.06% of income earned above $16,420. For a single childless individual, EITC benefis are phased-
in at a rate of 7.65% up to a maximum of $457. Benefits are subsequently phased-out at a rate of
7.65% until earnings of $13,460 beyond which EITC benefits are zero.
Dependent Care Tax Credit The dependent care tax credit is a non-refundable tax credit as
described in Section 2. It covers 35% of cost of formal child care up to a cap of $6k for two children
families earning less than $15,000. The tax credit rate declines by 1% for each $2,000 additional
income until it reaches a constant rate of 20% for families with annual gross income above $43,000.
Child Care and Development Fund We set the CCDF rate to 90% which is the recommended
subsidy rate under Federal guidelines. We take into account the fact that only a certain propor-
tion of eligible households received the CCDF subsidy: 39% of potentially eligible children living
in households below the poverty threshold, 24% of potentially eligible living in households with
income between 101 to 150% of the poverty threshold, and 5% of potentially eligible children liv-
ing in household with income above 150% of the poverty threshold but below the CCDF eligibility
threshold of 85% of state median income (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2009). We
therefore compute the average CCDF subsidy rate as 35.1%, 21.6%, and 4.5% for households with
income below, between 101% and 150%, and above 150% of the poverty threshold, respectively. The
poverty threshold for a single parent with two children was $17,568 and US median earnings was
$32,349 in 2010.
Calibration of θ
The calibration of θ is done as follows: define a grid over θ ∈ [0.5, 2.5] with equally spaced intervals
of 0.1. For each θ and z, we find the optimal labor supply predicted by our model l (θ, z) given
the actual US tax and benefit system. Given the selection corrected empirical distribution of wages
pi (z), we then compute the average labor supply predicted by our model for each θ, that is, we
compute l¯ (θ) = ∑
z
pi (z) l (θ, z). We find θ by minimizing the square of the distance between average
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labor supply predicted in our model and average labor supply in the data l¯data = ∑
z
pi (z) ldata (z):
θˆ = argmin
[
l¯ (θ)− l¯data
]2
After obtaining θˆ, we define a finer grid over θ (within a smaller interval that is inclusive of θˆ) with
equally spaced intervals of 0.01 and repeat the procedure in order to get a more precise estimate of
θ.
Calibration of M
Net transfers that the US government already allocates to mothers are computed as follows. Given
our calibrated values of θ, we simulate the chosen allocations (c(z), y(z), f (z)) for each type z, given
the actual tax and benefit system. Based on the computed earnings y (z), we then compute the
Federal and SS taxes, EITC, DCTC and CCDF benefits as described above. Unemployed mothers
receive unemployment benefits inclusive of TANF. Given the different net transfers received by
each z, we take the average:
M = −∑
z
pi (z) TE (y (z) , f (z))
where TE (y (z) , f (z)) are the net taxes computed based on the actual US tax and benefit system.
B.4 Numerical Algorithm
We numerically solve for the constrained optimal allocations using Matlab. First, we impose non-
negativity constraints on h, y. We then solve for the government problem using the following steps:
1. Relaxed problem. (a) Make an initial guess of values for the optimal allocations (c, y, h) and
maximize welfare by imposing the government budget constraint with equality and the LDIC
with inequality. (b) Use the solution in (a) as the new initial guess of values for (c, y, h) and
maximize welfare by imposing the government budget constraint with equality and all the
DIC with inequality. We have 1,275 DIC in total.
2. Ex-post verification. After having obtained the solution for the relaxed problem in point 1, we
check whether all the UIC are satisfied. If all LDIC are binding we do not need to check the
UIC as they are automatically satisfied from the proof of Lemma 1. Similarly, in the Ralwsian
case, Lemma 1 guarantees this ex-post check step is not needed.
3. Full problem. If the conditions in Step 2 are not satisfied, then use the solution in Step 1(b) as
the new initial guess of values for (c, y, h) and maximize welfare by imposing the government
budget constraint with equality and all the DIC and UIC with inequality. That is, solve the
full-blown problem. Excluding the 50 UIC for z1, we have 2, 500 incentive constraints in total.
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B.5 Further Sensitivity Analysis on Wage Bins
We conduct further sensitivity analysis with respect to the efficient child allowances and child care
subsidy rates. The implementation is as in Section 6.2, where we keep US net taxes (federal and SS
taxes net of EITC if employed and TANF if unemployed) fixed.
Figure A2 illustrates the baseline and US optimal child allowances and child care subsidy rates
as in Figure 6. Recall that the number of wage bins as per our calibration in Section 6 is 50, which
implies a maximum wage of $32.21. As the optimal child care subsidy rate relies on zN , we vary the
number of wage bins to see how sensitive the rate is to the maximum wage. Wage bin grids of 25,
100, and 500 points yield zN equal to $28.80, $35.60, and $38.80, respectively. As can be seen from
Figure A2, child allowances and subsidy rates for the different wage bins follow closely the baseline
optimal ones.
Sensitivity Analysis on Wage Bins
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Figure A2: Panel (a) illustrates child allowances and Panel (b) illustrates child care subsidy rates. The US
net income taxes are kept fixed (federal and SS taxes net of EITC if employed and TANF if unemployed) as
in Figure 6. The rates and allowances are illustrated for the baseline optimal scheme, for the US, and for the
baseline optimal scheme when using 25, 100 and 500 wage bins.
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